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Abstract
This dissertation addresses the central issue of understanding how frictions to information
flow distort the ability for prices to incorporate new information. In chapter 1, “Forgotten
Portfolios”, I illustrate how the ability of a stock’s price to impound information can rely
on the portfolios of its owners. I show that, in the presence of limited attention, investors
rationally allocate their attention towards processing information that has a greater impact on
their wealth. Chapter 2, “The Social Elite” (based on joint work with Alexander Chernyakov),
examines how casual social interactions impact asset prices. Social networks play a vital role
in the diffusion of information. I focus on fund managers and corporate officers of publicly
traded firms and present evidence of information transfer at exclusive social gatherings. I
find that when executives attend social gatherings their stock prices’ subsequent behavior
directionally predicts upcoming earnings surprises. I show that fund managers who attend
events that corporate officers from a particular firm also attend are more likely to purchase
stock in that firm. I explore potential reasons for this tendency and find that fund managers
demonstrably outperform when they decide to trade these socially-connected stocks. Further,
socially-connected stocks that fund managers do not purchase subsequently underperform.
In chapter 3, “Mean Reversion”, I propose a mechanism whereby learning from news jointly
explains the patterns of short horizon momentum and long horizon reversals observed in
equity prices. The model’s key departure from rationality is its assumption that investors
underestimate the relative precision of news. Under mild assumptions, investors will exhibit
a rational but perverse tendency to increase their belief in other private signals, regardless of
whether or not the private signal is true.
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Chapter 1
Forgotten Portfolios
1.1 Introduction
There is a long history of psychology literature that documents the inability of individuals
to allocate attention among multiple tasks. Early works such as Kahneman (1973) argue
that, “attention is a scarce cognitive resource and attention to one task necessarily requires
a substitution of cognitive resources from other tasks.”
In this essay I illustrate a mechanism whereby the rate at which information is impounded
into a stock’s price is related to the portfolios of its owners. I show that in the presence of
limited attention, investors rationally allocate their attention towards processing information
that has a greater potential impact on their wealth.
From sell-side equity analysts to mutual fund portfolio managers, participants in mod-
ern financial markets are constantly inundated with information to disseminate each day.
This has motivated the development of empirical asset-pricing models that explain the fac-
tors that impact how news enters prices. These frameworks have a common theme that
involves information-processing, and price-updating, until markets reflect publicly available
information.
The mechanism through which information is revealed is often the focal point when ex-
amining these issues. For example, more salient sources of news are impounded into prices
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more quickly. Huberman and Regev (2001) provide a striking illustration of this idea. They
examine the case of a biotechnology firm whose price increases four-fold after being featured
in a news article on the cover of the Wall Street Journal. At the time the news was released,
the firm’s price move was a response to a favorable assessment of recent innovations in can-
cer research. However, the article contained no actual new information; it was previously
printed in the journal Nature several months before. At the time of the original publication,
the news article resulted in a demonstrably smaller market response, which isn’t surprising
since mostly Scientists and specialist investors read the journal Nature. As an information-
revelation mechanism, the front page of the Wall Street Journal has a significantly greater
influence on the marginal price setter.
The example by Huberman and Regev (2001) highlights the key characteristic of gradual
information flow in asset markets. This essay provides a perspective on why information might
be impounded into prices slowly, that is distinct to the information revelation mechanism. I
examine how an investor’s level of distraction influences the responsiveness of prices to new
information. Specifically, when investors own a particular stock, but that stock is for each of
them only a small fraction of their portfolio, that stock is forgotten. For forgotten stocks, no
single investor makes it a priority to disseminate its news .
In the presence of news, stocks that are a small proportion of an investor’s wealth will
find it difficult to compete for attention. I quantify this tendency using a simple measure of
the degree to which a stock’s largest investors are the investors for which they are a relatively
small portfolio weight.
To better understand my approach, consider the following example. Table1.1 summarizes
all quantities discussed. Suppose there are two investors1, one which I will refer to as “BIG”
who has $50 of assets under management (AUM), and another referred to as “SML” who
has $5 of AUM. Next, focus on two companies, AAPL and LULU, that both have a market
capitalization of $5. Assume, that BIG owns $1 and $4 in AAPL and LULU respectively, and
that SML owns $4 and $1 in APPLE and LULU respectively. It follows that the percentages
1Investors in this context concretely refer to mutual funds.
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Table 1.1: Measuring Investor Inattention, An Example
Holdings Percentage of Portfolio Percentage of
Market Cap ($) Market Cap Weight Attention Attention
BIG SML BIG SML BIG SML BIG SML
AAPL 5 1 4 20% 80% 2% 80% 2% 98% 0.79
LULU 5 4 1 80% 20% 8% 20% 29% 71% 0.37
AUM
50 5
This table provides the numerical values for a example that motivates my measure of investor
inattention.
of each stock’s market capitalization owned by the investor is 20% = $1$5 and 80% =
$4
$5 . Notice
that the numbers imply that all of SML’s assets are invested between AAPL and LULU. On
the other hand, between AAPL and LULU, BIG’s owns a combined $5 and the remaining
$45 is assumed to be invested in other stocks. Other stocks will play no roll in this example.
BIG’s portfolio has 2% invested in AAPL, 8% invested in LULU. SML’s portfolio has
80% invested in AAPL, 20% invested in LULU. Suppose, each fund has 1 unit of attention
which is distributed proportionally. If we consider LULU, then we see that it is allocated 0.28
= 8% + 20% units of attention. Of this total 0.28 units, BIG is responsible for 29% = 0.080.28
and SML is responsible for 71% = 0.200.28 . Table 1.1 show that the equivalent percentages of
attention for AAPL are 2% and 98% for BIG and SML respectively.
I now pose my central question: For each of, AAPL and LULU, taken individually, to
what degree are its largest investors the investors for which they are a relatively small portfolio
weight.
Returning to the example, for LULU, BIG has 29% of the “attention-outstanding” by
holding 80% of the shares outstanding, and SML has 71% of the “attention-outstanding”
by holding 20% of the shares outstanding. I take the value-weighted average to obtain an
attention measure of 0.37 =
BIG︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.29 · 0.8 +
SML︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.71 · 0.2. The analogous quantity for AAPL is 0.79.
There is more aggregate attention allocated to AAPL than LULU.
In this example, AAPL is the quintessential high-attention stock. The intuition here is
that a single investor, SML, owns a relatively large quantity of AAPL (80% of its market
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capitalization). At the same time, SML’s entire portfolio (80% portfolio weight) consists of
AAPL . In this example, SML can be thought of as a highly specialized hedge fund manager;
SML has a small and concentrated portfolio that is largely in a single stock. AAPL has a
modest market capitalization in comparison to SML’s AUM, and so SML not only allocates
a lot of attention to AAPL but also exerts price impact on AAPL when he trades. This
measure forms the basis for my empirical strategy, and as this example demonstrates, my
approach is not simply a function of a stock’s breadth of ownership or market capitalization.
To test my forgotten stock hypothesis, I examine the impact that investor inattention
has on the robustness of post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). I separate stocks into
high-attention and low-attention groups each month. Within attention groups, stocks are
further grouped to form PEAD portfolios on the basis of their most recent earnings surprise.
The low-attention PEAD portfolio earns monthly factor adjusted-alphas of 153 basis points
(t=3.5) whereas the high-attention PEAD portfolio is statistically insignificant and earns
only -6 basis points (t=-0.24) in monthly factor adjusted alphas.
This effect of attention on PEAD is essentially monotonic across attention quintiles. I
construct a portfolio that captures the pure inattention effect. Specifically, I construct a
spread portfolio that hedges out “earnings momentum” by going long the low-attention PEAD
portfolio and shorting its high-attention analog earns monthly factor-adjusted alphas of 160
basis points (t=3.3). Moreover, these economically significant alphas are not associated with
large loadings on common risk factors. In particular, the magnitudes and t-statistics on risk
factor loadings are small and insignificant.
I examine my mechanism in additional detail by illustrating that when investors’ attention
constraints are binding then the effect is exacerbated. I combine news data and mutual fund
holdings, in order to determine when investors face abnormally large news shocks about the
stocks that they own. Then for each stock, I measure the degree to which that stock’s owners,
on average, face an unexpected cognitive burden. I find that the underreaction pattern
exhibited by forgotten stocks is most pronounced in stocks held by information-burdened
funds. The spread between the low-attention PEAD portfolio and its high-attention analog
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earns monthly factor adjusted alphas of 225 basis points (t=2.14).
These results are true for both value-weighted and equal-weighted specifications of my
test. I observe no sign of any return reversal in the subsequent six months after portfolio
formation. Finally, I find that this effect is not driven by a few years in the sample nor does
it attenuate in recent years.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 1.2 of the essay provides a
brief literature review and background on the topic. Section 1.3 describes the data used
and reports a variety of summary statistics. Section 1.4 briefly outlines my hypothesis and
presents the essay’s central results. Section 1.5 explores my underreaction mechanism in
detail. Section 1.6 provides robustness checks and section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Context
This essay is integrally related to previous studies that analyze the effects of investors’ limited
information processing capacity. The central theme of this strand of literature is that investors
have limited capability to collect, consolidate, and interpret information, and therefore, we
should expect asset prices to incorporate information slowly. More generally, there is a long
history of literature that examines the inability of individuals to allocate attention among
multiple tasks, such as early works like Kahneman (1973). Numerous theoretical models
have since examined the effect of limited attention on market efficiency. For example, Merton
(1987), Hong and Stein (1999), and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) argue that, in the presence of
limited investor attention, delayed information revelation can generate return predictability
that cannot be explained by traditional asset pricing models.
These theoretical foundations are largely supported by subsequent empirical studies. In
particular, Huberman and Regev (2001), Barber and Odean (2006), DellaVigna and Pollet
(2006), Hou (2006), Menzly and Ozbas (2006), Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007), and
Cohen and Frazzini (2008) find that stock prices respond quickly to more salient information
(e.g., news printed on the front page of the New York Times or information about stocks that
have recently experienced extreme returns or trading volume). This essay also contributes
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materially to a growing literature that focuses on the interplay between the media and capital
markets. Antweiler and Frank (2004) examine messages in internet chat rooms focused on
stocks and argue that message activity is related to trading volume and volatility. Tetlock,
Saar-Tsechansky, Macskassy (2008) quantify the language used in financial news stories in an
effort to predict firms’ accounting earnings and stock returns. They find that the fraction of
negative words in firm-specific news stories forecasts low firm earnings, that firms’ stock prices
briefly underreact to the information embedded in negative words and that the earnings and
return predictability from negative words is largest for the stories that focus on fundamentals.
Broadly speaking, I add to this literature by showing that the stock price reaction to even
the most salient news will be delayed if investors’ attention is directed away from it towards
other news that is more likely to affect their wealth.
My framework has novel implications for predictability by linked information events such
as industry news. Previous works, such as Ramnath (2002), examine the correlation between
earnings surprises of firms within in the same industry and finds that the first earnings
surprise within an industry has information for both the earnings surprises and returns of
other firms within the industry. Related to these findings I show that news about stocks with
high investor attention predicts the subsequent returns of their low attention industry peers
(but not the reverse).
Finally, this essay is also related to a general literature on the effects of institutional
ownership on stock returns. Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that
increased investor sophistication is usually associated with less susceptibility to behavioral
biases. Recent research, however, shows that institutional investors are certainly not im-
pervious. For example, Frazzini (2006) shows that post-announcement price drift is most
severe whenever capital gains and news events have the same sign. In a similar manner,
- Wermers (2003) shows that underperforming fund managers exhibit a strong disposition
effect and Coval and Shumway (2000) provide evidence of loss aversion among professional
market makers. Using the holdings of institutional investors, I provide evidence that one can
identify a subset of stocks to which they pay less attention. This finding is consistent with
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the previous evidence of institutional investors’ susceptibility to behavioral biases.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The data in this study are collected from a variety of sources. Stock returns and firm char-
acteristics are obtained from the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases respectively. Sell-side
analysts coverage is obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S).
Financial news data is obtained from the Wall Street Journal, spans January 2000 to Decem-
ber 2008 and covers all U.S. equities and ADRs. Mutual fund holdings are obtained from the
Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Mutual Funds database.
Mutual funds are required to report their holdings semiannually. However, over half of the
funds in my sample period file quarterly reports. Using these periodic portfolio snapshots I
construct daily notional portfolios based on the last filing. Filings are assumed to be publicly
available 30 days after the file date2. Following Frazzini (2006) observations are omitted
whenever:
1. the number of shares in a fund portfolio exceeds the total amount of shares outstanding
2. the value of the fund’s holding of a particular stock exceeds the total value of the fund
as reported by Thomson\CDA.
3. the stock is reported as having zero shares outstanding
4. for funds for which we there is a link to the CRSP dataset, the total asset value of the
fund reported by Thomson\CDA differs from that which is reported by CRSP by more
than 100%.
Common stocks with prices below $5 are excluded.
Since I am examining my theory as it relates to equities, I exclude funds that are self-
reported as being focused on Municipal Bonds, Bond & Preferred and Metals. Additionally,
2This assumption is rather conservative since in recent years filings are usually available on the next business
day.
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since I seek understand in effects induced by the marginal price setter I exclude funds believed
to be index funds from the sample.34
1.3.1 Aggregate Summary Statistics
Table 1.2 reports summary statistics for the stocks and mutual funds my sample. Panel A
summarizes the coverage of funds and stocks present in the sample for select years. Columns
2 and 3 report the counts of the number of the funds and the number of stocks respectively.
We see that subsequent to the year 2000, there are roughly 10,000 funds in the cross-section
each year and this number is largely constant. It is about a half of that in the preceding
5 years and it approximately 2,500 between 1990 and 1995. The number of stocks in the
sample has remained roughly constant over the entire time window. Column 3 reports the
percentage of the universe of CRSP/COMPUSTAT common stocks present in my sample. As
is the case with the counts of stocks, the percentage of stocks doesn’t move around notably
except for in the most recent part of the sample. Column 4, reports then proportion of
the total market capitalization of distinct stocks held by funds in my sample divided by the
total market value of the CRSP/COMPUSTAT stock universe. Looking at the percentage of
market value, one key takeaway is that although the percentage of stocks is closer to 50%,
the stocks in the sample are larger than the median and comprise over 70% of both the total
market capitalization of common stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.
3I exclude funds explicitly labeled as index fund in the CRSP mutual fund database. Additionally, since
the links between the CDA and CRSP database is limited to only a subset of all funds I exclude funds whose
name includes the words: “index”, “indx”, ”total market”, “REIT”, “nasdaq”, “QQQQ”, “S&P” , “russell
1000” , “russell 2000”, “russell 3000” and funds with more than 1,000 holdings.
4Information on funds’ status as an index fund is obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database.
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Table 1.2: Institutional Holdings, Summary Statistics
Panel A. Mutual Fund Portfolios, Time Series
Year No. of Funds Stocks Coverage Percentage of Stocks Percentage of Market Value
1985 964 4,538 45% 65%
1990 1,335 4,678 44% 67%
1995 4,326 5,907 53% 71%
2000 10,086 5,835 60% 80%
2005 11,708 4,472 71% 87%
Panel B. Pooled Fund-Year Characteristics
Mean Median Min Max SD P20 P80
AUM ($MM) 281 47 3 27,967 1,098 8 269
Number of holdings 75 45 9 1,829 125 21 92
Panel C. Pooled Firm-Year Characteristics
Mean Median Min Max SD P20 P80
Size percentile 62% 65% 29% 100% 24% 40% 86%
Book-to-market percentile 48% 47% 12% 100% 27% 21% 75%
Analyst Coverage Percentile 56% 61% 13% 100% 30% 20% 85%
Breadth of ownership 115 57 7 2,293 191 17 147
This table presents a summary of the stock and mutual fund data used in this paper. Panel
A reports the number of mutual funds in my sample for select years and the coverage of
the CRSP/Computstat universe of the stocks held by these funds. Panel B presents pooled
fund-year statistics of the funds in my sample. Panel C presents pooled firm-year statistics
of the stocks in my sample.
Panel B presents pooled fund-year sample statistics of the funds in my sample. This
is useful in contextualizing magnitudes of inputs used to generate my inattention measure.
Assets under management (AUM) is the market value of the equity holdings of a fund in
millions. We see that over the entire sample the median fund has approximately $47 million
in AUM. Funds usually have between $10 million and $300 million in AUM. Funds typically
hold about 45 positions and usually have between 20 and 100 positions.
Panel C reports the sample characteristics compared to all stocks in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT
universe. We see that the sample is slightly biased towards larger stocks (65th percentile),
but close to the median in terms of book-to-market price (47th percentile). Stocks in the
sample have slightly more analyst coverage and have a breadth of ownership of 57. Taken
together this suggests that the baseline data sample is unlikely to be pathological in a manner
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that would bias the results.
1.4 Underreaction in Forgotten Stocks
In this section I examine return predictability in forgotten stocks and present my central
results. This section has 3 distinct goals. I begin by describing the details of my attention
measure and formally stating my hypothesis. Second, I present an example from the data
and provide intuition regarding the magnitudes of various quantities. Third I test my main
hypothesis; I use calendar time portfolios, as well a regression framework in which I can
better control for several determinants of firm returns.
1.4.1 Measuring Investor Inattention
I proceed with some definitions and notation. For a stock s and a mutual fund f , in each
monthly time period t, I denote by hs,f,t the dollar value of f ’s holding in s. I denote by Fs,t
the collection of funds that hold s and I denote by Pf,t the set of stocks held by f (ie: fund
f ’s portfolio).
Let AUMf,t denote the dollar value of stock’s equity holdings5
I define MFSHAREs,f,t, the share of a stock’s aggregate mutual fund ownership that
fund holds
MFSHAREs,f,t ≡ hs,f,t∑
fj∈Fs,t hs,fj ,t
(1.1)
I define ωs,f,t, the portfolio weight of a fund’s stock holding, as the fund’s dollar holding
divided by its AUM
ωs,f,t ≡ hs,f,t
AUMf,t
(1.2)
I define ω∗s,f,t, the proportion of aggregate portfolio weight attributed to a fund’s holding,
as the fund’s portfolio weight in the stock divided by the sum of the portfolio weights in the
stock across all funds
5This is assets under management
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ω∗s,f,t ≡
ωs,f,t∑
fj ωs,fj ,t
(1.3)
My raw attention measure, is given by
ATTNRAWs,t ≡
∑
fj∈Fs,t
(
ω∗s,f,t ·MFSHAREs,fj ,t
)
(1.4)
Next, since the measure ATTNRAWs,t is likely to be related to a variety stock specific
characteristics that are unrelated to my theory. I control for these stock-specific factors by
performing monthly cross sectional regressions that orthogonalize the raw attention measure
and produce my final attention measure.
The final attention measure, denoted by ATTNs,t, are the residuals from these monthly
cross sectional regressions.
ATTNs,t ≡ εs,t (1.5)
where εs,t is obtain from the monthly cross-sectional regressions of the form
ATTNRAWs,t = αt + θt ·Xs,t + εs,t (1.6)
The terms αt and θt are coefficient estimates. Xs,t is a panel of controls.
The cross sectional regressions control for beta, size, book-to-market, breadth of owner-
ship, fraction of market cap owned by mutual funds, idiosyncratic volatility and past returns.
These regressions are reported in table 1.3. BETA is the coefficient on market excess return
from monthly regressions of daily excess returns on the three Fama and French factors and the
Carhart momentum factor. BM is the log of the book-to-market ratio which is the Compustat
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; BM is computed as of the June of
the previous calendar year following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). SIZE
is the log of the firm’s market value of equity as of the previous calendar month. RETt−1
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and RETt−1,t−6 are the past one and six month stock returns respectively. RETt−2,t−12 is
the prior-year stock return excluding the past month. IDIOVOL is the standard deviation of
the residuals from a monthly regression of daily excess returns on the three Fama and French
factors and the Carhart momentum factor. TURN is the average turnover in the previous 12
months and NASD is a NASDAQ dummy. As in Frazzini (2008), I allow the coefficients to
be different for NASDAQ stocks since turnover numbers have a different interpretation in a
dealer markets. ANALYSTCOVER is the number of analysts that cover the stock as of the
previous calendar month.
Table 1.3 reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) results from performing these cross sectional
regressions. Specification 1 shows that ATTNRAWs,t is negatively related to size and mutual
fund ownership. Therefore the classification as a forgotten stock (low ATTNRAWs,t ) is more
likely in large-caps. In specification 2 I add recent returns. Here we see that stocks that have
experienced large recent losses are more likely to be higher attention., with most of the effect
coming from RETt−2,t−12 (prior-year excluding the past month). In specification 3 I add
idiosyncratic volatility. Higher IDIOVOL stocks are more likely to be high-attention stocks
which makes sense. In specification 4 I add turnover (past year) and an interaction term
between turnover and returns as a control. The results show that controlling for other size
and idiosyncratic volatility especially, higher volume stocks tend to have lower attention.
Here this is likely due to the interaction with BM, which goes from a t-stat of 2.57 to -0.45
between specifications 3 and 4. In specification 5 I add analyst coverage. I find the intuitive
result, that more visible stocks, such as those with higher analyst coverage, tend to have
higher ATTNRAWs,t. I use the residual attention measure derived from specification 1 to
construct my residual attention measure.
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Table 1.3: Measuring Investor Inattention, Fama-Macbeth Regressions
Dep Var: ATTNRAWs,t
1 2 3 4 5
BETA -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(-18.45) (-17.00) (-17.55) (-16.41) (-16.39)
BM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.10) (1.64) (2.57) (-0.45) (-0.08)
SIZE -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-44.25) (-45.01) (-45.32) (-46.01) (-48.69)
MFOWN -0.51 -0.50 -0.50 -0.47 -0.48
(-23.35) (-23.15) (-23.09) (-23.07) (-23.70)
BREADTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(16.28) (17.28) (17.06) (17.30) (18.08)
RETt−1 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(-2.43) (-1.75) (0.92) (0.85)
RETt−2,t−12 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(-29.19) (-29.14) (-25.57) (-25.86)
IDIOVOL 0.13 0.34 0.34
(6.12) (11.92) (12.19)
TURN -10.77 -10.89
(-12.92) (-13.84)
NASD·TURN 2.39 2.42
(4.98) (5.00)
ANALYSTCOVER 0.00
(6.47)
INTERCEPT 1.35 1.40 1.39 1.38 1.39
(45.36) (46.07) (46.38) (46.97) (49.64)
R2 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40
This table reports coefficients from Fama–MacBeth regressions of the raw attention measure,
ATTNRAWs,t, on a set of firm-specific regressors.
1.4.2 Forgotten Stock Hypothesis and Underreaction
I describe my primary hypothesis and present an investment rule to construct the test port-
folios. I postulate that in the presence of limited-attention, investors rationally allocate their
cognitive resources towards processing information that has a larger impact on their wealth.
Consequently, attention is directed away from stocks that have a smaller impact on investors’
wealth thereby generating post-event drift in these lower impact stocks.
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HYPOTHESIS FS (FORGOTTEN STOCK): A stock’s price underreacts to in-
formation events when it’s largest investors are the ones that own it as a
relatively small proportion of their portfolio. When investors’ attention con-
straints bind tightly, stocks experience additional underreaction to information
events. When investors’ attention constraints are relaxed underreaction is less
pronounced for all stocks.
1.4.3 Baseline PEAD Portfolios
The focus of my analysis is the effect of stock specific news on underreaction. As such,
I use earnings surprise (the cumulative return from day t-1 to t+1 around the last earn-
ings announcement) as my proxy for firm news. My first set of tests analyzes the returns
to momentum after sorting according to by Attention Coefficients. I use a monthly post-
earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD) strategy as the benchmark portfolio when presenting
the results.
Table 1.4: PEAD Portfolios, Monthly Alphas
Bad News Good News
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Raw Spread 0.80% 1.03% 1.09% 1.22% 1.49% 0.69%
(1.95) (3.11) (3.57) (3.74) (3.83) (6.73)
CAPM -0.43% 0.00% 0.15% 0.21% 0.30% 0.73%
(-2.34) (0.02) (1.20) (1.65) (1.82) (7.03)
FF 3-Factor -0.51% -0.11% 0.04% 0.12% 0.27% 0.78%
(-4.70) (-1.21) (0.44) (1.47) (3.33) (7.55)
4-Factor -0.38% -0.04% 0.08% 0.15% 0.30% 0.69%
(-4.08) (-0.44) (0.92) (1.91) (3.85) (7.16)
5-Factor -0.38% -0.04% 0.08% 0.16% 0.31% 0.69%
(-3.97) (-0.49) (0.97) (2.00) (3.91) (7.09)
This table reports raw and factor-adjusted alphas for cross sectional sorts of stocks based on
their most earnings surprise.
In table 1.4 raw and factor-adjusted alphas for the baseline PEAD strategy. At the
beginning of every calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their
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most recent earnings surprise. The earnings-surprise ranked stocks are assigned to 5 quintile
portfolios. The L/S reports results for going long the stocks in the 5th earnings surprise
quintile and selling short the stocks in the 1st earnings surprise quintile. Stocks are value
weighted within a given portfolio , and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month
to maintain value weights. The dependent variable is the monthly excess return. I begin by
reporting returns of this PEAD strategy. The last column in Table 1.4 confirms that there
is significant earnings momentum in the full sample. The benchmark long-short portfolio
generates monthly factor adjusted-alphas of 78 basis points (t=7.5). Negative (positive)
earnings surprise stocks display negative (positive) return continuation, and the effect is
monotonic across quintiles. My values are comparable to those reported in previous studies
of PEAD.
1.4.4 Investor Inattention and PEAD Portfolios
Table 1.5 reports monthly alphas for the main test assets. At the beginning of every calen-
dar month, stocks in the highest and lowest attention quintile are independently ranked in
ascending order on the basis of their most recent earnings surprise. The earnings surprise
ranked stocks are assigned to 5 quintile portfolios. The columns labeled L/S report results
for going long the stocks in the 5th earnings surprise quintile and selling short the stocks in
the 1st earnings surprise quintile. Stocks are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain
value (or equal) weights. Separating stocks according to their attention quintiles induces
large differences in subsequent PEAD.
Table 1.5 shows that a PEAD strategy that focuses solely on the trading low attention
stocks earns large and significant returns, while a strategy that trades high-attention stocks
does not. For example, the value-weighted PEAD portfolio in the low attention-quintile earns
a three-factor alpha of 153 basis points per month (t=3.49), or almost 20% per year, while
the high-attention momentum portfolio earns an insignificant -6 basis points per month (t=-
0.24). These pronounced patterns are similar for both equal-weighted and value-weighted
returns, suggesting that predictability is not limited to smaller firms.
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Table 1.6 presents the performance of the PEAD portfolios in table 1.5 for each of the
attention quintiles.
Table 1.6: Alphas by Attention Coefficient Quintiles
Panel A: Alphas by Attention Coefficient Quintiles (Equal Weighted)
High Attention Low Attention Inattention Effect
Q5 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 L/SLOW − L/SHIGH
Raw Spread 0.43% 0.52% 0.46% 0.63% 1.42% 0.99%
(2.93) (3.53) (2.83) (4.21) (8.22) (5.11)
CAPM 0.49% 0.59% 0.54% 0.62% 1.42% 0.93%
(3.27) (3.98) (3.31) (4.08) (8.03) (4.71)
FF3 Factor 0.52% 0.64% 0.61% 0.64% 1.49% 0.97%
(3.49) (4.30) (3.72) (4.19) (8.75) (5.21)
4-Factor 0.44% 0.54% 0.52% 0.53% 1.41% 0.97%
(2.99) (3.74) (3.26) (3.62) (8.36) (5.16)
5-Factor 0.46% 0.52% 0.53% 0.52% 1.42% 0.96%
(3.11) (3.59) (3.26) (3.50) (8.34) (5.05)
Panel B: Alphas by Attention Coefficient Quintiles (Value Weighted)
High Attention Low Attention Inattention Effect
Q5 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 L/SLOW − L/SHIGH
Raw Spread -0.16% 0.01% 0.04% 0.35% 1.39% 1.55%
(-0.66) (0.04) (0.16) (0.99) (3.25) (3.35)
CAPM -0.14% 0.12% 0.08% 0.61% 1.40% 1.54%
(-0.56) (0.66) (0.31) (1.73) (3.18) (3.23)
FF3 Factor -0.06% 0.18% 0.17% 0.73% 1.53% 1.58%
(-0.24) (0.99) (0.62) (2.08) (3.49) (3.31)
4-Factor -0.22% 0.04% 0.05% 0.55% 1.40% 1.62%
(-0.90) (0.23) (0.18) (1.59) (3.19) (3.34)
5-Factor -0.22% 0.05% 0.05% 0.49% 1.42% 1.63%
(-0.89) (0.26) (0.20) (1.40) (3.20) (3.35)
This table reports raw and factor-adjusted alphas for long-short PEAD portfolios within each
attention quintile. Panels A and B present the results of portfolios formed using equal and
value weights respectively.
Further, Table 1.6 shows that the returns to the PEAD strategy increase monotonically
as the attention quintile decreases. Further, we can see from Figure II that the cumulative
return to the high and low PEAD hedge portfolios exhibits no sign of any return reversal (or
convergence) in the subsequent 6 months after the event date. These robust results support
Hypothesis FS: A stock’s price underreacts to information events when most of its owners
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hold it as a small proportion of their portfolio.
Figure 1.1 depicts the cumulative returns of the high- and low-attention earnings mo-
mentum portfolio as well as their spread. It is a graphical depiction of table 1.6. The key
takeaway from figure 1.1 is that the alphas appear robust from a time-series perspective. The
effect persists and returns accumulate in throughout the entire sample window.
Figure 1.1: Inattention Effect, Cumulative Performance
This figure depicts the raw cumulative return of the high- and low-attention earnings mo-
mentum portfolios. In addition, this figure includes the long-short portfolio strategy that
goes long the low-attention earnings momentum portfolio and goes short the high-attention
earnings momentum portfolio.
Table 1.7 reports Fama and French (1993) three-factor loadings and alphas for the monthly
PEAD strategy in each attention quintile. In addition, I include the results to a pure inat-
tention effect portfolio, L/SLOW − L/SHIGH . This is the portfolio that hedges out earnings
momentum as a factor by going long the low attention portfolio and selling short the high
attention portfolio.
L/SLOW ( L/SHIGH ) is the alpha of a zero-cost long-short PEAD portfolio of low (high)
attention stocks. L/SLOW−L/SHIGH is the portfolio that hedges out earnings momentum as
a factor by going long the low attention portfolio and going short the high attention portfolio.
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Table 1.7: Five Factor Time-Series Regressions: Alphas and Factor Loadings
Panel A: Factor Loadings (Equal Weighted)
High Attention Low Attention Inattention Effect
Q5 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 L/SLOW − L/SHIGH
Alpha 0.46% 0.52% 0.53% 0.52% 1.42% 0.96%
(3.11) (3.59) (3.26) (3.50) (8.34) (5.05)
MKT -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 0.05 -0.03 -0.01
(-0.76) (-2.09) (-2.36) (1.52) (-0.81) (-0.14)
SMB -0.17 0.00 -0.05 -0.14 0.12 0.29
(-3.74) (-0.02) (-0.99) (-3.02) (2.20) (4.85)
HML -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0.05 -0.13 -0.11
(-0.45) (-0.75) (-1.91) (0.95) (-2.16) (-1.58)
UMD 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.00
(3.98) (4.95) (3.52) (5.15) (3.32) (-0.09)
VWF -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03
(-1.23) (1.15) (-0.20) (0.83) (-0.38) (0.61)
R2 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
Panel B: Factor Loadings (Value Weighted)
High Attention Low Attention Inattention Effect
Q5 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 L/SLOW − L/SHIGH
Alpha -0.22% 0.05% 0.05% 0.49% 1.42% 1.63%
(-0.89) (0.26) (0.20) (1.40) (3.20) (3.35)
MKT 0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.25 -0.03 -0.04
(0.23) (-2.81) (-0.61) (-3.31) (-0.33) (-0.42)
SMB -0.18 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 0.02 0.20
(-2.36) (0.23) (-0.93) (-0.87) (0.13) (1.30)
HML -0.11 -0.06 -0.15 -0.17 -0.27 -0.16
(-1.26) (-0.88) (-1.49) (-1.37) (-1.71) (-0.92)
UMD 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.27 0.19 -0.05
(4.58) (5.67) (3.12) (3.59) (2.02) (-0.46)
VWF 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.14 -0.04 -0.04
(-0.03) (-0.30) (-0.23) (1.68) (-0.38) (-0.33)
R2 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.1
This table reports 5 factor loadings. That is, the results of a regression of monthly portfolio ex-
cess returns on the monthly returns from the three Fama and French (1993) factor-mimicking
portfolios, Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor, and the Pastor, Stambaugh (2001) liquidity
factor. Panels A and B present the results of portfolios formed from equal and value weights
respectively.
The low-attention earnings momentum portfolios tend to have a slight negative beta and
tend to be tilted towards growth stocks. The intercepts of the both the low-attention and
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inattention effect portfolio are striking (142 basis points (t=3.2) and 163 basis points (t=3.35)
respectively).
Moreover, both inattention-effect portfolios have large returns despite negative loadings
on HML, which, ceteris paribus, should decrease expected returns. All of the portfolios in
the first 5 columns have a positive exposure to momentum. This is expected and reflects the
fact that these portfolios are conditional momentum portfolios. The high-attention earnings
momentum portfolio has a slight tilt towards large cap stocks and has the highest (albeit
insignificant) market beta.
Neither of the inattention-effect portfolios have statistically significant factor loadings in
the Fama & French framework, which is consistent with returns being driven by underreaction
to the news content, rather than reflecting systematic risk.
1.4.5 Inattention Effect in Cross Sectional Regressions
Next I test my underreaction hypothesis in a regression framework, in which I can better
control for other determinants of firm returns and isolate the marginal effect of my main
variable, the Attention Coefficient.
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Table 1.8: Forgotten Portfolio PEAD Returns, Cross Sectional Regressions
Dep Var: RETt
1 2 3 4 5
EARNSURP 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(7.93) (8.02) (9.75) (10.73) (11.15)
ATTNt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.12) (0.95)
ATTNt·EARNSURP -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(-1.76) (-1.58) (-1.71) (-1.97) (-1.73)
BM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.80) (1.10) (2.19) (3.11)
SIZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.01) (0.13) (2.77) (1.48)
RETt−1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
(-4.83) (-5.76) (-6.86)
RETt−2,t−12 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.48) (1.52) (0.59)
IDIOVOL 0.36 0.26
(5.41) (4.14)
TURN 7.07
(7.00)
NASD·TURN -3.23
(-4.30)
INTERCEPT 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00
(4.04) (1.24) (1.18) (-1.36) (-0.45)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09
This table reports Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of stock returns on earnings surprise
and its interaction with my attention measure.
Specifically, my next set of tests employs monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) forecasting
regressions of one month ahead cumulative stock return on firm characteristics and indicators
for past information events interacted with my attention variable. Since increased attention is
associated with decreased underreaction I would expect the attention to decrease the effect of
earnings surprise on returns. In performing my regression analysis, I restrict regressions to the
month following the earnings announcement. After controlling for well-known determinants
of stock returns, such as size, book-to-market ratio, idiosyncratic volatility and turnover I find
that the coefficient on my interacted variable ATTNt·EARNSURP has a modest negative
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effect, consistent with my predictions and portfolio results.
1.5 Information-Burdened Investors
In this section I identify a subset of stocks that are owned by investors with attention con-
straints that are likely to be binding. I test the hypothesis that investors react more sluggishly
to news when they must divide their attention among many different sources of information.
I posit that the inattention effect that I document should be larger (smaller) when a stock’s
owners are faced with abnormally large (small) amounts of portfolio relevant news to sift
through.
I combine data on mutual fund holdings with stock-level news counts to construct a
proxy for news about a basket of stocks (PORTNEWSf,t). It is the aggregate volume of
monthly news about the stocks in a fund’s portfolio. If limited investor attention is driving the
inattention effect, then for a given stock, ownership by funds with increased PORTNEWSf,t
(controlling for other fund specific factors) should amplify the magnitude and significance of
the result.
I expect funds to dynamically allocate their attention across time periods. In addition,
I expect there to be heterogeneity in information processing capacity across funds. For
example buy-side analysts may spend more hours in the office during earnings season. To
control for this I add the variable EAMONTH proportion of a fund’s stocks that had earnings
announcements in that month.
Cross sectional regressions are run every calendar month across the funds in my sample
to orthogonalize the PORTNEWSf,t measure with respect to the past 3 months of lagged
portfolio news PORTNEWSf,t−k k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the proportion of a fund’s stocks that had
earnings announcements in that month (EAMONTH) and the average market capitalization
of the stocks in a fund’s portfolio (AVGSIZE).
PORTNEWSf,t = αt + θf,t ·Xf,t + εf,t (1.7)
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The fund-level information processing burden is the residual from the cross sectional
regression εf,t. Funds with high εf,t are faced with processing more news about their portfolio
than expected.
Table 1.9 examines the determinants of PORTNEWSf,t. Here I report the results from
monthly fund-level cross sectional regressions PORTNEWSf,t on a set of controls. Although
PORTNEWSf,t is highly persistent it does not have a unit root. We see in specification 4
that PORTNEWSf,t increases during earnings announcement months.
Table 1.9: Estimating Unexpected Portfolio News, Fama-Macbeth Regressions
Dep Var: PORTNEWSf,t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PORTNEWSf,t−1 0.99 0.68 0.63 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.63
(53.13) (20.79) (18.12) (53.21) (52.78) (52.81) (18.40)
PORTNEWSf,t−2 0.33 0.25 0.24
(9.45) (6.70) (6.66)
PORTNEWSf,t−3 0.12 0.12
(3.50) (3.51)
EAMONTH 2.96 2.94 2.61
(5.98) (5.67) (5.77)
AVGSIZE 0.03 0.05 0.06
(0.81) (1.03) (1.63)
INTERCEPT 0.66 0.56 0.51 0.36 -0.15 -0.66 -1.06
(8.04) (7.49) (7.23) (4.11) (-0.15) (-0.65) (-1.30)
R2 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.92
This table reports the results from monthly fund-level cross sectional regressions of the form
PORTNEWSf,t = αt + θf,tXf,t + εf,t
The dependent variable, PORTNEWSf,t, the aggregate monthly news about the stocks in
the fund’s portfolio.
Next, I consider the effect of a fund’s information processing burden on the ability for
information to be quickly impounded into prices of it holdings. The burdened ownership of a
stock (BURDENOWNs,t) is the average information processing burden of a stock’s owners
weighted by the share of mutual fund ownership of the stock by that fund.
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BURDENOWNs,t ≡
∑
fj∈Fs,t
[(
hs,fj ,t
IOs,t
)
εfj ,t
]
Table 1.10: Correlation between Burdened Ownership and Firm Characteristics
BURDENOWNs,t |BURDENOWNs,t|
ATTNt 2% -10%
BM -5% 1%
SIZE 9% -10%
RETt−2,t−12 0% 1%
IDIOVOL -4% 5%
TURN 4% -2%
MFOWN 0% -11%
BREADTH 8% -7%
This table reports spearman rank correlation coefficients for BURDENOWNs,t and a set of
firm specific characteristics.
Table 1.10 presents Spearman rank correlation coefficients calculated over all months and
stocks for BURDENOWNs,t and a set of firm specific characteristics. We see that a stock’s
burdened ownership is not highly correlated with any firm specific characteristics. As such,
I do not expect portfolio sorts based on burdened ownership to be swamped by unrelated
effects such as firm size, value or institutional ownership.
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Table 1.11: Attention Alphas of Stocks Held by Burndened Funds
Panel A: Equal Weighted
High Attention Low Attention Inattention Effect
Q1 Q5 L/SLOW − L/SHIGH
High Burdened Ownership 0.11% 2.15% 2.04%
(0.30) (5.97) (4.44)
Low Burdened Ownership 0.37% 1.07% 0.71%
(1.09) (2.74) (1.64)
Panel B: Value Weighted
High Attention Low Attention Inattention Effect
Q1 Q5 L/SLOW − L/SHIGH
High Burdened Ownership -1.19% 1.06% 2.25%
(-3.01) (1.06) (2.14)
Low Burdened Ownership 0.68% 1.18% 0.50%
(1.40) (1.82) (0.69)
This table presents the effects of burdened ownership on PEAD attention portfolios. Panels
A and B present the results of portfolios formed from equal and value weights respectively.
Under the null hypothesis that information burdened funds are less likely to allocate
attention to their forgotten holdings we expect that
(L/SLOW − L/SHIGH)Burdened > (L/SLOW − L/SHIGH)Unburdened
That is, The spread between the momentum returns of low attention stocks versus high
attentions stocks (the inattention effect) to be more pronounced for stocks that are held by
burdened fund managers. Table 1.11 presents the effects of burdened ownership on high and
low attention quintile PEAD portfolios formed using value and equal weights respectively.
The monthly alpha from the value-weighted inattention effect portfolio for stocks with high
burdened ownership is 204 basis points per month (t = 4.44). Meanwhile the inattention
effect for stocks with low burdened ownership is an insignificant 107 basis points per month
(t =2.74)).
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1.6 Robustness Tests
In this section I perform a variety of additional robustness checks the results of which are
depicted in Table 1.12 First, I show that the return predictability I document remains eco-
nomically and statistically significant for stocks in a variety of information environments.
Specifically, I show that the inattention effect is present in both the above- and below-median
subsamples by analyst coverage . Next, I show that after orthogonalizing for firm size, stocks
with high ownership by institutions (by breadth or by share of market cap) tend to exhibit a
stronger inattention effect. This results because my measure has an increased signal-to-noise
ratio when the stock has higher ownership and thus more information is dissipated by my
sample of marginal price setters. Next, I show that the effect is more pronounced in smaller
firms, which is consistent with increased frictions in the presence of tightly binding limits
to arbitrage. Further, the inattention effect is exacerbated in growth stocks, consistent with
increased information gathering requirements for firms with more intangible assets.
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Table 1.12: Robustness & Variation in Inattention
Panel A: Effect of Analyst Coverage and Fund Ownership on Inattention
Inattention Effect
MOM L/SLOW L/SHIGH L/SLOW − L/SHIGH
Baseline 1.06% 1.65% 0.35% 1.30%
(6.02) (4.68) (1.06) (2.80)
Higher Analyst Coverage 1.10% 1.89% 0.47% 1.68%
(4.64) (3.92) (0.99) (2.41)
Lower Analyst Coverage 1.16% 1.65% 0.28% 1.14%
(4.73) (3.16) (0.52) (1.51)
Higher Breadth of Ownership 1.10% 1.77% 0.14% 1.80%
(5.13) (3.28) (0.35) (2.65)
Lower Breadth of Ownership 1.28% 2.03% 0.41% 1.43%
[4.91] [3.97] [0.76] [1.96]
Higher Mutual Fund Ownership 1.00% 2.17% -0.04% 2.30%
(4.95) (3.77) (-0.09) (3.45)
Lower Mutual Fund Ownership 1.22% 1.20% 0.69% 0.69%
(4.89) (2.47) (1.23) (0.94)
Panel B: Robustness Tests
Inattention Effect
MOM L/SLOW L/SHIGH L/SLOW − L/SHIGH
Larger Firms 0.88% 0.79% 0.48% 0.65%
(3.80) (1.86) (1.02) (1.15)
Smaller Firms 1.29% 2.62% 0.01% 2.78%
(5.95) (5.18) (0.03) (3.97)
Value Stocks 1.04% 1.40% 0.76% 0.71%
(4.58) (2.80) (1.41) (0.92)
Growth Stocks 1.12% 1.34% -0.27% 2.05%
(4.96) (2.74) (-0.53) (2.99)
Higher Idio Vol 1.20% 1.72% 0.12% 1.64%
(5.37) (3.40) (0.24) (2.42)
Lower Idio Vol 0.76% 1.61% 0.78% 0.89%
(3.55) (4.03) (1.88) (1.54)
1985-1996 1.22% 1.51% 1.08% 0.44%
(4.92) (2.56) (2.29) (0.59)
1997-2008 1.09% 1.51% -0.17% 1.68%
(3.92) (3.19) (-0.31) (2.50)
DGTW 1.11% 1.76% 0.46% 1.30%
(6.83) (5.22) (1.45) (2.94)
This table reports abnormal returns for baseline PEAD and my main test portfolios.
High (Low) Analyst coverage stocks are those with analyst coverage above (below) the
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median of the IBES sample in that calendar month. High (low) breadth of ownership stocks
are those with a breadth of ownership above (below) the median of the CDA Spectrum and
CRSP/Compustat merge in that calendar month. Analyst coverage breadth of ownership
and mutual fund ownership are orthogonalized with respect to firm size. Value (growth)
stocks are those with book to market above (below) the median of the CRSP/Compustat
sample in that calendar month. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined (following
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)) as raw monthly returns minus the returns
on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, book-to-market, and one
year momentum quintile
For stocks with more binding limits to arbitrage, we should see a stronger inattention
effect, as more arbitrageurs are less likely to engage in trading and fully update these firms’
prices. The proxy I sure for limits to arbitrage is idiosyncratic volatility. As shown in rows 5
and 6 of Panel B in Table 1.12, the inattention effect is larger; for stocks with above median
IDIOVOL the inattention effect yields 3 factor alphas of 164 basis points per month (t=2.42)
however for stocks with below median IDIOVOL the effect reduces to 89 basis points per
month (t=1.54). This is consistent with my prediction that firms that are more likely to
expose arbitrageurs to noise trader risk should exhibit a stronger inattention effect.
In Rows 7 and 8 of Table 1.12 Panel B I partition my sample temporally into subsamples
from 1985 to 1996 and from 1997 to 2008. The inattention effect yields a 3 factor alpha of
44 basis points per month (t=59) in the earlier subsample and 168 basis points per month
(t=2.94) in the more recent subsample. Inspecting Figure 1.1 which depicts the annual
performance of the inattention effect strategy we see that the poorer performance in the
earlier subsample is likely to be biased downwards by 2 years (1985 and 1987). Nevertheless
there is convincing evidence to suggest that the inattention effect has not suffered from
arbitrage attenuation and has become stronger in the later part of the sample. Lastly, I show
that my return predictability remains economically and statistically significant when using
an alternative benchmark of expected returns. Specifically, I calculate characteristic-adjusted
returns following Daniel et al. (1997). Using the same portfolio procedure described in Table
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III, and characteristics-based adjustments for all firms, I report the resulting excess returns
in the last row of Table X Panel B. Characteristic adjusted returns to the inattention effect
portfolio remain large and statistically significant: returning value weighted 3 factor alphas
of 130 basis points (t=2.94) per month.
1.7 Conclusion
I investigate a mechanism by which the rate at which information is impounded into a stock’s
price is related to the portfolios of its owners. I show that in the presence of limited attention
investors rationally allocate their attention toward information channels that have a large
potential impact on their wealth. Specifically, I find convincing evidence that a stock’s price
underreacts to information events when its largest owners hold it as a small proportion of
their portfolio. Further, I show that stocks whose owners are attention constrained tend to
experience additional underreaction to information events. In particular, the documented
inattention effect is amplified in the subset of stocks held by attention constrained funds,
yielding a value weighted three factor alpha of 225 basis points per month (t=2.14 ).
Consistent with investor inattention driving my results I find that the earnings news of
high attention stocks predicts subsequent returns in their low attention industry peers (but
not the reverse). I also find that the average earnings surprise of a stock’s high attention
industry peers strongly predicts its future excess returns whereas the returns of the low
attention peers does not.
A simple portfolio strategy that takes advantage of this return predictability yields eco-
nomically and statistically significant risk adjusted profits of over 24% per year during the
23 year period from 1985 to 2008. These returns are distinct from previously known under-
reaction determinants, robust to different specifications and exhibit no return reversal in the
long-run. In addition, the effect becomes more pronounced in recent years.
Most modern asset pricing frameworks have the common theme of information gathering
and processing with the information revelation mechanism as the focal point. I show that in
the presence of limited attention the rate at which information is impounded into a stock’s
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prices is not only dependent on the information revelation mechanism but also intimately
related to the attention constraints of the stock’s owners. Specifically, I show that a stock’s
price will underreact to even the most salient news if its largest owners allocate their attention
away from it.
Understanding how frictions arising from investors’ bounded rationality aggregate to im-
pact price updating will provide a better picture of how capital responds to trading oppor-
tunities and a better understanding of what drives asset prices.
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Chapter 2
The Social Elite6
2.1 Introduction
Asset prices reflect investor beliefs, which are in turn driven by the flow of information. Many
important channels supporting this flow of information are complex and difficult to observe.
Because of this, the interplay between social networks and market efficiency has become a
focal point in empirical asset pricing.
In this essay, we demonstrate that personal connections amongst the socio-economic elite
has a significant impact on asset prices. By analyzing the timing and attendee composition of
elite social gatherings, we provide evidence that casual social relationships are a conduit for
information that affects investor behavior. Specifically, our analysis examines the interactions
between equity fund managers and corporate officers of publicly traded firms. We study these
two categories of individuals both jointly and in isolation. Looking specifically at firms, we
show that when executives attend social gatherings their stock price’s subsequent behavior
directionally predicts their upcoming earnings surprise. Studying funds and firms jointly, we
show that fund managers that attend events that corporate officers from a particular firm
also attend are more likely to purchase stock in that firm. In asking why this is the case we
find that fund managers demonstrably outperform when they decide to trade these "socially-
connected" stocks. Further, the socially-connected stocks that they decide not to trade then
6This chapter is based on Joint work with Alexander Chernyakov
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underperform. Looking specifically at fund managers, we highlight a strong pattern where
subsequent to these events, fund managers tend to increase their positions in stocks that were
overweight by other fund managers.
To better understand our approach, consider the following example from our data7.
Figure 2.1: Fund Managers’ Holdings & Social Events, a stylized example
This figure depicts actual total returns of XYZ Corp. (anonymized name) during the first 2
quarters of 2013, the incidence of a social event and changes in several equity fund managers’
holdings
At the beginning of 2013, a handful of funds reported having only de-minimis positions
in XYZ Corp. But by the end of Q1 three funds reported via 13F filings that they had
purchased substantial stock positions. These funds had never owned XYZ Corp during their
prior 13F reporting history. Looking toward potential explanations for the 3 funds’ decisions
to purchase XYZ Corp, our data reveals that several key portfolio managers employed by the
3 funds attended the ’Indwood House Gala’ on March, 13 2013, during the previous quarter.
Also in attendance at that Gala was XYZ Corp’s CFO and his wife.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this time-line of events. Between the January 1, 2013 and May 23,
7Fund manager and firm names have been redacted
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2013 XYZ’s stock price rises over 50%.
More generally, the 3 funds in this example are not the only funds employing investors who
frequent the same events as XYZ’s CFO. Between 2007 and 2013 executives from XYZ Corp
attended several social events like the one in this example. Looking at the price dynamics of
XYZ Corp around these social events reveals a tendency for the average returns near event
dates to produce superior forecasts of earnings surprises. Using a disparate collection of data
sources we are able to cleanly test this hypothesis in generality.
Our approach is novel because unlike previous studies, that have focused on static so-
cial network dynamics and activities stemming from connections formed prior to information
transfer (such as school ties or geographic and board interlock networks), we focus on un-
systematic interactions that occur in casual social settings. In addition, because our focus is
on fund managers and corporate officers, there is a clear incentive structure, on the part of
fund-managers, that drives our hypotheses. On the one hand, fund managers have a strong
desire to acquire information about firms in which they may want to invest, and on the other
hand corporate officers are likely to possess valuable information about their firm. As such,
we believe that these two classes of agents, taken together, provide an ideal basis for studying
the impact that social networks have on information transfer.
The types of events we study are gatherings such as charity fundraisers, Wall Street cen-
tric socials, art gallery openings and high society galas within the United States. These
events are typically invitation-only or have substantial attendance fees, and are almost exclu-
sively attended by financial professionals, socialites, senior corporate officers and executives.
Attendees are heavily skewed towards the very wealthy, educated and financially sophisti-
cated, thus providing an appropriate setting for studying asset-pricing predictions since such
individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market.
2.1.1 Intuition
We present a specific example of a real life case involving social events and information
exchange that we believe captures the essence of our mechanism. We do not suggest that
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information transferred at social events is necessarily illicit. Rather, this example serves to
highlight an unambiguous instance of information exchange in our setting.
Edward Downe Jr. has as life story whose beginnings exemplify the American dream.
He came from moderate means to become the head of a vast magazine empire. This initial
entrepreneurial success marked the beginning of a relentlessly extravagant lifestyle. He be-
came a socialite and immersed himself in the New York social scene and charity circuit. In
1980, he began a romantic relationship with Charlotte Ford, the great granddaughter of Ford
Motor Company founder Henry Ford. And six years later they were married. He often threw
galas at his and his wife’s beachfront homes in Southampton, NY. In 1992, the SEC argued
that these events were a hub for the exchange of insider information and that its attendees
used this information to reap millions of dollars in illegal stock market profits. In addition
to Downe, the case implicated several other of high profile corporate officers, investors and
Wall Street executives. The SEC asserted that between summer of 1987 and early 1989,
various members of this social group exchanged confidential information about several com-
panies and that some of them then traded in those stocks illegally. Ultimately, Downe was
convicted of wire fraud and securities fraud, amongst other charges and was fined $11 million
(Bill Clinton later pardoned the charge on his last day in office). The above case provides a
unique perspective of our mechanism as a channel through which information flows within
financial markets.8,9,10,11,12
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a brief background
and literature review. Section 2.3 describes the social events and the market data used in the
essay. Section 2.3 also presents a panel of summary statistics. Section 2.4 lays out our most
basic result, evidence of information leakage at social events. Section 2.5 studies, in detail,
the mechanism through which information leakage occurs and highlights the impact of social
8http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/05/business/a-new-insider-trading-case-hits-major-business-
figures.html
9http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1992-06-21/nailing-the-southampton-seven
10http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/01/style/charlotte-ford-wed-to-edward-downe-jr.html
11http://www.courant.com/opinion/editorials/hc-rennie0222.artfeb22-column.html
12http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/24/nyregion/both-clintons-met-supporters-of-4-hasidim-given-
leniency.html
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events on investor decision making. Section 2.6 extends our mechanism to interactions solely
between fund managers and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The Setting
Our research ties together a rich literature on the behavior of professional investors with an
expanding literature on the interplay between financial markets and social networks. And
relates closely to a branch of literature that focuses on how individuals’ membership in
certain groups influences their behavior. Most similar to our work are the findings in Cohen,
Frazzini and Malloy (2008). They find that mutual fund portfolio managers place larger bets
on firms when connected to through shared education networks. They also find that these
same fund managers perform significantly better on these connected holdings relative to their
non-connected analogs. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2010), finds that analysts outperform
on stock recommendations on companies with which they have an educational link. Hong,
Kubik, and Stein (2005), document word-of-mouth effects between same-city mutual fund
managers with respect to their portfolio choices. They show that mutual fund managers are
more likely to buy (or sell) a particular stock if other managers in the same city are buying
(or selling) that same stock.
Prior research has focused on the impact of static networks on firm decisions and out-
comes. For example, empirical finance literature on network sociology typically employs the
use of corporate board linkages or board interlocks between firms as a measure of personal
networks (Useem (1984),Mizruchi (1982, 1992), Hallock (1997), Larcker et al. (2005) and
Conyon and Muldoon (2006)). Our approach is different in that we can observe directly
the flow of information through our social network. Our research relates to several distinct
threads of the literature on professional investors. Primarily, fund manager performance and
informed/insider trading. Evidence of stock selection amongst fund managers is mixed. Some
studies (Jensen (1968), Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), Malkiel (1995), Grinblatt, Tit-
man, and Wermers (1995), Gruber (1996), Daniel et al. (1997), Wermers (1997) and Carhart
(1997)) find that mutual fund managers are successful in achieving superior returns while
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others cast serious doubt on this assertion.
Works by several authors (Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Cao, Chen, and Gririn (2005),
Augustin, Brenner and Subrahmanyam (2014)) investigate informed trading activity in equity
and equity options prior to corporate events and document pervasive evidence of informed
trading prior to these events.
Our examination of information exchange between fund managers also builds on the em-
pirical evidence of investor herding by Wermers (1999) among others. The literature identifies
several reasons why managers may herd, such as due to reputational risk (Scharfstein and
Stein (1990)), correlated private information (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992)) or copy-
ing better informed managers (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)). This research
suggests that social interactions are a channel through which fund managers’ ideas diffuse.
Our ideas relate directly to prior work done on investor herding. For example, Froot, Scharf-
stein, and Stein (1992) point out that if the market is populated with short term investors,
then the perception of the truth, can sometimes be more important than the truth itself .
Social events are an ideal setting to gauge perceptions of other investors by exchanging pri-
vate information. We show that the portfolios of investors who attend a social event together
subsequently become more similar.
Finally, even though the literature suggests that active investment managers lack the
ability to generate alpha, recent work by Cohen et. al (2010) documents evidence to the
contrary. Specifically, they show that investment managers select a set of core "best-ideas"
but due to institutional incentives, also select stocks that do not have alpha. We contribute
to this literature by presenting evidence that these core "best-ideas" are disseminated when
investors casually socialize with each other and with corporate executives.
2.3 Data
The data in this study are collected from a multitude of sources and can be placed into three
distinct categories
1. Stock and mutual fund market data, such as prices, holdings and market capitalization
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2. Event data, comprising the dates and attendees of social events
3. Biographical information, used to link unique individuals to equity funds or publicly
traded firms
Data on fund holdings comes from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings Database,
which includes all registered 13F institutions filing with the SEC. It provides common stock
holdings as reported on Form 13F filed with the SEC. Specifically, subsequent to 1978 all
institutions with more than $100 million under management are required to fill out 13F
forms quarterly for all U.S. equity positions that have a market value of more than $200,000
or which constitute more than 10,000 shares. It should be noted that in contrast many
academic studies that center on mutual fund holdings, our analysis focuses on active mutual
funds as well as hedge funds. Daily and monthly stock returns are obtained from the Center
for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) via the New York Stock Exchange/American Stock
Exchange (NYSE/AMEX) tape. Stock return data is matched with fundamental data taken
from CRSP/COMPUSTAT merge database and we ensure that any accounting variables used
are known to the market before the returns that they are used in conjunction with.
In order to bring together the specific set of gatherings covered in this study, we under-
took an extensive look into the types of social events that are typically attended by influential
individuals. We focus on individuals who can influence investment decisions in active equity
funds and individuals in powerful corporate positions. Our goal is to create a broad rep-
resentative panel of events that constitutes the social calendar of a quintessential corporate
socialite. In order to better understand the ways in which the public media represents high-
society events, we conducted a bottom-up examination of the various outlets that specialize
in capturing this socialite lifestyle. We settled on following core group of data sources that
we believe allow us to capture just that:
1. Patrick McMullan & Co
2. Billy Farrell Agency New York
3. Guest of a Guest
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4. Panache-Privee
5. New York Social Diary
6. Bloomberg’s "Scene Last Night" Column
7. CharityHappenings.org
Of these 7 data sources, the first 6 data sources explicitly contain events and attendees and
CharityHappenings.org contains social events for major charities and non-profit institutions.
Patrick McMullan & Co is a photography firm focused exclusively on capturing highly
exclusive events. It is run by the eponymous American photographer and socialite based
in New York City. The extent to which Patrick McMullan & Co is a fixture in the New
York social circuit is often said to be evidenced by the common use of the word “Patrick”
as a verb in the same way that “Google” and “Facebook” are used as slang for obtaining
information about an individual in the internet. Billy Farrell Agency New York is a digital
photography agency that was established in 2010 by a group of former photographers from
Patrick McMullan. Guest-of-a-Guest is another website similar to those described above
and maintains a database of society events, people, and places. Panache Privee is a digital
photo archive and blog which describes itself as "a leading interactive network of aﬄuent and
influential people, helping them connect and learn more about their peers". The New York
Social Diary is public blog that publishes photographs of various socialites at a variety of past
events and maintains a calendar of future events that they might attend. Bloomberg’s "Scene
Last Night" Column, written by Amanda Gordon, provides more formal written coverage
of events ranging from charity gala’s to birthday celebrations of hedge fund managers. All
of these sources are public and are novel in this specific context in that for each event
they publish the names of attendees of event. In most cases these sites also provide tagged
photographs where individuals’ names have been mapped to unique ontological entities. The
various event data sources are collected and cleaned using a combination of web-scraping,
textual-analysis and hand-matching. Data collection and processing methodology is discussed
in detail in the appendix.
38
Separately, we collect data on the senior board membership of major philanthropic orga-
nizations. We then associate with each charity a set of related events that are attended by its
members. CharityHappenings.Org contains the dates of charity events. These charity events
are then linked to the charity board’s executives and fund managers. Figures 2.2 depicts
what thes structure of
Figure 2.2: Social Event Data Sources, An Example
This figure is a screen-shot of the website for Patrick McMullan & Co, one of the data sources
that was proceesed in order to create the social event and attendee information used.
Biographical information on various categories of individuals is obtained from BoardEx,
a dataset produced by Management Diagnostics Limited, a research firm that specializes in
social network data on company officials. Hedge funds and active mutual funds are hand
matched, by name, to their respective corporate entities within Boardex, and publicly firms
are identified by CUSIP number. For each corporate entity, Boardex then provides a list
of key personnel. For example, for funds, Boardex provides biographical information about
senior portfolio managers and traders, and for publicly traded firms provides information
39
about senior company officers such as the CEO, CFO, Chairman, etc. The data contains
current and past roles of every individual with start and end dates. In addition, Boardex
provides data on charity board membership. We map fund managers’ and corporate officers’
charity board membership information to a comprehensive set of dates of important fund-
raising events for those charities (details discussed below). We then use the calendar of these
events and the attendees implied by charities’ senior board members as a subclass of events
in our study. Figure 2.1 provides a sense of what results from combining biographical data
from Boardex with social event data from various sources. We are able to construct a clean
picture of which fund manager and executives attended specific events and when these events
transpired.
Table 2.1: Excerpt from Social Calender Extract
Date Event Name Executives Fund Managers
...
Thursday, April 11, 2013 Public Art Fund 2013 Spring Benefit 7 11
Monday, May 13, 2013 Robin Hood Benefit 2013 11 11
Tuesday, May 14, 2013 2013 High Line Spring Benefit 6 16
Tuesday, June 18, 2013 MoMA PS1 Benefit Gala 2013 8 11
Saturday, July 20, 2013 Long House White Night Summer Benefit 4 19
...
This table presents an excerpt of the final social calendar data obtained by parsing the
web-sites of New York Social Diary, Guest of a Guest, Patrick McMullan & Co., Billy Far-
rell Agency New York, Panache-Privee, Bloomberg’s Scene Last Night, and CharityHappen-
ings.org.
Taken together our data sources are able to tell us, for example, that John Smith, a
portfolio manager at Harvard Management Company attended the Robin Hood Benefit 2013
Gala on Monday, May 13, 2013. We are also able to crisply determine whether or not the
CFO of XYZ Corp was also in attendance.
2.3.1 Aggregate Summary Statistics
Table 2.2 summarizes the attendance of events by fund managers and executives. Panel A
summarizes the annual average number of distinct firms, corporate officers, funds and fund
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managers present at each event. We see that on average an event has 11 firms and 2 funds
in attendance. At first it might seem odd that the average number of corporate officers is
roughly 9, which is smaller that the average number of firms. This is because some executives
sit on the boards of several companies. When this occurs we attribute each of these board
connections to that individual thereby resulting in a one-to-many mapping that frequently
adds additional firms.
41
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Social Events, Firms & Funds
Panel A: Annual Event Composition
Average Number of Distinct Entities per Event
Year Firms Corp Officers Funds Fund Managers
2007 11.0 8.5 1.6 1.5
2008 11.3 8.9 1.7 1.6
2009 12.4 9.5 1.8 1.6
2010 12.4 9.7 1.8 1.7
2011 11.2 8.8 1.9 1.7
2012 11.7 9.1 2.0 1.9
2013 11.0 8.5 2.2 2.0
Panel B: Quarterly Event Attendance Statistics
Mean Median Min Max
Events 291 272 137 563
Events Attended Per Firm 2.8 2.7 2.0 4.0
Events Attended Per Fund 2.9 2.8 1.8 4.8
Panel C: Pooled Fund-Quarter Characteristics
At least 1 social event No social events
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max
Funds 167 160 90 269 2538 2518 2238 2787
AUM Percentile 62% 62% 57% 65% 49% 49% 49% 50%
Number of holdings 222 224 177 256 178 176 167 198
Panel D: Pooled Stock-Quarter Characteristics
At least 1 social event No social events
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max
Stocks 526 532 334 731 3281 3267 2774 3840
Size percentile 48% 48% 44% 54% 50% 50% 50% 51%
Book-to-market percentile 53% 53% 50% 55% 50% 50% 49% 50%
This table presents a summary of the event, stock and fund data used in this paper. For
each year in our sample Panel A summarizes the average number of distinct firms, corporate
officers, funds and fund managers present at each event. Panels B - D provide time series
properties (mean, median, minimum, maximum) of quarterly summary statistics. Panel B
presents counts of the number of events, events attended per firm and events attended per
fund each quarter. Panel C juxtaposes the characteristics of funds in our sample that have
attended at least one social event with those that have attended none. Panel D juxtaposes
the characteristics of firms whose executives have attended at least one social event in a given
quarter with those that have not.
Panel B enumerates events, events per firm and events per fund each quarter; we see
that there are about 280 events each quarter and conditional on a firm or fund attending
any events they attend about 2.7 on average. We see in panel C that among funds we have
roughly 6% coverage since 160 funds attend at least one social each quarter. Panel C also
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juxtaposes the characteristics of funds that have attended at least one social event with those
that have attended none; funds that attend at least one social event have slightly higher
AUM (approx 60th vs 50th percentile) and hold slightly more positions (approx 220 v.s.
180). Finally, the characteristics of firms whose executives have attended at least one social
event in a given quarter with those that have not. Here, percentiles are derived ex-ante
from the entire CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged universe of stocks having share codes 10 and
11. Panel D highlights that among publicly traded firms those that attend social events are
roughly balanced in size (if not slightly smaller) and have a slight value tilt.
2.4 Information Leakage in Casual Social Interactions
2.4.1 Earnings Predictability in Socially Connected Securities
We begin by presenting our canonical result that we believe serves as the driving force for
the results in later sections. Specifically, we show that the average returns of stocks on
days subsequent to social events attended by the firm’s executives predicts upcoming earning
surprises.
Our first test approaches the issue by directly evaluating the forecasting ability of social
events in OLS regressions. This approach allows us to cleanly control for any residual corre-
lation that our event based instruments might contain. Our second test approaches the issue
by asking if our mechanism creates distortions that are pronounced enough to be exploited
by an arbitrageur. We test this hypothesis by constructing an equivalent trading rule which
buys (sells) stocks that have been bid up (down) on the heels of social events.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. First, we compute Earnings surprise (EarnSurp), as
the return of a stock in the three day window, centered around an earnings announcement
adjusted for the market return in that window. This is completely orthodox. Next, we
isolate the dates of each social event attended by a firm’s corporate officers during a given
quarter. We then measure the price impact (PIs,t) of each event as the 1 week excess return
subsequent to, and including, the event date. We define the SocialEventReturn for a stock
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each quarter as the equally weighted average of these 1 week excess returns.
To be precise, if there is a social event on date t for stock s then we define the variable
PIs,t =
4∏
j=0
(1 + xrets,t+j)
as the price impact due to the social event, where xrets,t+j is the excess return over the
value weighted market index.
We also define,
PIPrevs,t =
−1∏
j=−5
(1 + xrets,t+j)
and
PINexts,t =
9∏
j=5
(1 + xrets,t+j)
as the analogous variables shifted by ± 1 week.
Now, for a given earnings surprise we compute SocialEventReturn as the average PIs,t,
ensuring that the index t+ 5 is strictly before the day prior to the earnings surprise (so there
is no look-ahead). Averaging PIPrevs,t
and PINexts,t yields analogous terms for SocialEventReturnPrev and SocialEventRe-
turnNext.
Table 2.3 reports pooled quarterly stock-level OLS regressions of earnings surprises on
returns around social events. We see that there is a distinctly large and significant coefficient
on SocialEventReturn.This is true even when controlling for a number of other factors. The
t-statistic on SocialEventReturn ranges from 4.9 to 5.62.
Since the instruments SocialEventReturnPrev and SocialEventReturnNext are designed
to act as placebo tests for SocialEventReturn, the true value of the social event instrument
is seen when we compare its statistic to that of SocialEventReturnPrev and SocialEventRe-
turnNext. It is notable that simply by shifting by a week in either direction we observe a
pronounced decline in the t statistics on social event returns.
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Table 2.3: Social Event Returns & Earnings Surprise Predictability, OLS regressions
Dep Variable: EarnSurp
1 2 3 4 5 6
SocialEventReturn 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
5.62 5.86 5.63 4.74 4.89 4.89
SocialEventReturnPrev 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
3.84 3.55 2.85 2.93 3.03
SocialEventReturnNext 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
2.57 2.38 1.66 1.79 1.99
EarnSurpPrev 0.04 0.04 0.04
4.99 3.93 3.92
RETm6 0.41 0.27 0.21
3.99 2.48 1.95
SIZE 0.00
3.49
BM 0.00
4.15
IDIOVOL 0.00
-1.45
Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
-6.24 -6.05 -5.89 -5.34 -5.42 -3.85
This table reports pooled quarterly stock-level OLS regressions of earnings surprises on re-
turns around social events. We tests the hypothesis that returns immediately following a
social event have predictive power for upcoming earnings surprises by estimating the follow-
ing regression
EarnSurps,t = α+ β · SocialEventReturns,t + θ ·Xs,t + εs,t
The units of observation are stock-quarter. The dependent variable, Earnings surprise (Earn-
Surp), is defined as the return of a stock in the three day window, centered around an earnings
announcement adjusted for the market return in that window. Social Event Returns (So-
cialEventReturn) are defined as 5 day returns of firms subsequent to social events where an
executive from that firm was present. The sample here consists only of firms that have at least
one social event in a particular quarter. When a firm has more than one social event during
that quarter we compute the equally weighted average of these 5 day returns Xt denotes a
set of controls.
We now construct a trading rule which buys (sells) stocks that have been bid up (down)
on the heels of social events. Table reports daily calendar time excess returns of portfolios
formed conditional on information embedded in price dynamics after social events. Test
portfolios initiate positions 1 business day prior to a stock’s earnings announcement date and
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liquidate positions 1 day after, holding positions for a total of 3 business days. Portfolios are
formed as follows: at the close of each business day we begin by identifying the stocks that
have an earnings announcement in the next 2 days. This is the widest set of stocks can be
included in portfolio formation for today. We then identify the subset of stocks that have had
at least one social event during the last 60 business days and compute Social Event Returns.
Social Event Returns are defined as 5 day returns of firms subsequent to (and including)
social events where an executive from that firm was present. When a firm has more than
one social event during this 60 day signal formation period we compute the equally weighted
average of these 5 day returns. We buy (sell) stocks that have experienced positive (negative)
Social Event Returns. Buys and sells are hedged by taking an equal and opposite position
in the value weighted market portfolio. As such, on any given day the net dollar exposure
taken by this test portfolio is exactly zero and the gross exposure is either 0 or 1.
Table 2.4: Social Event Earnings Anticipation, Abnormal Returns
Raw Return 4-Factor Alpha
Social Event Returns 179.7 172.9
1.4 1.4
Social Event (-1 week) Returns 47.5% 43.6
0.4 0.3
Social Event (+ 1 week) Returns -23.8 -22.0
-0.2 -0.2
This table reports monthly calendar time excess returns of portfolios formed conditional on
information embedded in price dynamics after social events. Although we report results for a
daily rebalancing strategy, monthly alphas (in basis points) are presented to make quantities
comparable throughout the paper.
Figure 2.3 depicts the cumulative returns of portfolios formed conditional on social event
dynamics. We again buy (sell) stocks that have experienced positive (negative) Social Event
Returns. Here we however do not force the gross exposure to be unity (by having active
weights that sum to one). We instead construct the portfolio to have time-varying gross
exposures (varying number of ’bets in the book’). Although the strategy is now unconstrained
in the number of bets that can be taken the net dollar exposure taken by this test portfolio
46
is still exactly zero. The return process in figure 2.3 has a sharpe ratio of approx 1.2.
Figure 2.3: Time Series of Earnings Anticipation, Abnormal Returns
This figure shows the cumulative returns of portfolios formed conditional on information
embedded in price dynamics after social events. We buy (sell) stocks that have experienced
positive (negative) Social Event Returns. Buys and sells are hedged by taking an equal and
opposite position in the value weighted market portfolio. As such, on any given day the net
dollar exposure taken by this test portfolio is exactly zero. The strategy is unconstrained in
the number of bets that can be taken but it is normalized ex-post to an ex post standard
deviation 10%.
These robust patterns deepen the question as to what mechanism is driving correlations
we observe. This is precisely what we confront in the next section.
2.5 Mechanism: Social Influence & Investor Behavior
2.5.1 Measuring Social Connectivity
We are now in a position to turn our attention to the explicit joint interactions between
corporate officers and fund managers. In this section we examine fund managers’ trading
decisions with a focus on the role of social networks in the transfer of information to security
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prices.
We begin by using shifts in fund manager portfolio weights as a tool for understanding
their behavior. We compare purchases and sales in stocks where funds managers have recently
had a social connection to those where they have not. Equity fund managers may trade in
and out of securities for a proliferation of reasons. For example, some fund managers, though
active, may be constrained in their ability to deviate from the weights of a benchmark or
may be prohibited from becoming excessively concentrated in an industry. In addition to
institutional details, fund managers may also trade as a result of cognitive biases, for example
the disposition effect (Frazzini (2006)) or familiarity bias (Huberman (2001)).
In order to examine the impact of social connections on trading decisions we first con-
cretely specify a notion of social connectivity. We define the variable SocialConnection which
is an indicator variable that specifies whether or not a fund manager attended a social event
that was also attended by a corporate officer for that firm during the past quarter. It’s worth
noting that our hypotheses are contemporaneous.
So for example, suppose we are studying the impact of social events on the propensity of
fund managers to increase their positions. If we are looking at changes in fund managers’
position changes during the second calendar quarter we designate the social events that
transpired between April 1st and June 31st as part of our SocialConnection variable. In
this example, the observed change in portfolio holding is based juxtaposing snapshots made
on March 31st and June 31st. As such, the social evens will be aligned with the changes.
Later in the essay when we study how these socially induced trades perform we focus on the
returns of stocks during the subsequent quarter. In this example, this would be the return of
the stock from July 1st through September 30th.
All of the results in this and subsequent sections are robust to defining Social Connections
using both the current and previous quarters instead of just the current quarter. In the
appendix we also perform our tests using the variable SocialConnectionPast2QTRs, which is
an indicator variable that specifies whether or not a fund manager attended a social event
that was also attended by a corporate officer for that firm in the past 2 quarters.
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2.5.2 Trading in Socially Connected Securities
Table 2.5 presents pooled OLS regressions of changes in fund manager portfolio weights on
social event attendance variables, where the units of observation are stock-fund-quarter. We
include quarter-fund fixed effects in all of our specifications and standard errors are adjusted
for clustering at the quarter level. The independent variables of interest are those measuring
the attendance of fund managers and executives at social events.
This table depicts our canonical result: all else equal, fund managers tend to increase their
portfolio weight in stocks of firms subsequent to attending a social event with executives from
that firm. Looking at specification 1 we see that fund managers increase their portfolio weight
by roughly 27.5 basis points (t=3) in securities when they have a social connection during
that quarter.
Table 2.5: Portfolio Rebalancing Subsequent to Social Events, OLS Regressions
Dep Variable: Change in portfolio weight dW (BPS)
1 2 3 4
SocialConnection 27.548 28.03 52.74 53.64
3.065 3.13 5.10 5.12
SocialFirm -0.24 -2.85
-0.14 -5.46
SocialFund -1.15 -0.56
-1.62 -0.35
Controls No No Yes Yes
Fixed Effect Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Fixed Effect Fund Fund Fund Fund
This table reports pooled fund-stock-quarter OLS regressions of equity fund manager trading
activity on fund and stock social event attendance characteristics. SocialConnection is an
indicator variable that specifies whether or not an investor employed by fund f attended
a social event that was also attended by a corporate officer affiliated with stock s during
quarter t. SocialFirm is an indicator variable that specifies whether or not any corporate
officers affiliated with stock s attended any social events during quarter t. SocialFund is
an indicator variable that specifies whether or not any fund managers employed by fund f
attended any social events during quarter t.
Our mechanism relies on fund managers and corporate officers attending the same events.
One could argue that both funds and firms having employees that attend social events are
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simply more visible institutions. This theory would imply that our social connection variable
might just be a proxy for funds that are social, as opposed to the interaction effect that funds
and firms attend the same events. The mechanism in aforementioned case could, for example,
be that by being more visible social funds are more likely to attract new clients and have
capital inflows. These inflows would induce correlation between our social connection variable
and changes in portfolio weights. Similarly, this visibility theory also suggests that our social
connection variable might just be a proxy for firms with visible executives, regardless of event
co-attendance with specific fund managers. Again, via stocks, the mechanism in this case
would be that by being more visible social firms are more likely to be attract more interest
from institutions. These purchases would induce correlation between our social connection
variable and changes in portfolio weights.
The empirical strategy in specifications 2 and 4 of table 2.5 disentangles our theory from
these visibility hypotheses. In order to control for the possibility that funds and firms that
attend any social events are different from those that do not attend social events we add
two event-specific control variables, SocialFirm and SocialFund. SocialFirm is an indicator
variable that specifies whether or not any corporate officers affiliated with that firm attended
any social events during that quarter. SocialFund is an indicator variable that specifies
whether or not any fund managers employed by that fund attended any social events during
that quarter. The statistical significance of our SocialConnection variable (t=3) is largely
unchanged when the SocialFirm and SocialFund controls are added. Furthermore, as can be
seen in specification 2 the statistical significance of the controls are negligible.
In specifications 3 through 4 we include as variety of controls. We control for stock-level
characteristics such as market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, past 12 month return, the
number of positions held by the fund, breadth of ownership and the fraction of the stock’s
market cap that is owned by active equity fund managers. Book to market is computed as
of the June of the previous calendar year following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997). We also control for fund level characteristics such as the percentage of the fund’s
total net assets invested in the style corresponding to the stock being considered (style is
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calculated using the 5x5x5 SIZE,BM,MOM quintiles from the CRSP/Computstat universe
as of the end of the previous month) and the average change in portfolio weight in that
stock during that quarter across all funds. Once the control are added in specifications 3 and
4 we can no longer easily interpret the coefficients on SocialConnection as simple increase
or decrease in portfolio weight. Nevertheless, we continue to observe a robust correlation
between SocialConnection and changes in fund manager portfolio weights (t=5.1).
2.5.3 Returns to Socially Connected Trades
In this section we study the performance of fund managers’ trading in socially connected
securities. The fact fund managers are more likely to purchase stocks of firms having ex-
ecutives with whom they have attended social events does not imply that this decision is
advantageous. That is, the correlated trading documented in the previous section need not
be due to superior information gathering by fund managers. It could instead be due to one
of many cognitive biases, which could result in these trades being poor choices. For instance,
given the empirical results thus far, a perfectly plausible hypothesis could be a “top of mind”
effect in firms. That is, fund managers, upon interacting with firm executives at social events,
subsequently seek out information about these firms but have no actual informational edge in
assessing firm value or timing trades. This “top of mind” alternative hypotheses can explain
the induced purchases that we see in the data but could not explain any outperformance on
these purchases that might exist.
2.5.3.1 Types of Trades
In the analysis that follows we overlay a useful taxonomy on the types of trades that fund
managers might perform. Before proceeding to the main analysis we discuss this issue briefly.
We study the characteristics of stocks that are bought, initiated, picked-up, sold and liqui-
dated by fund managers. Naturally, buys are stocks where a fund manager has increased
holdings of the stock since the last report date and sells are stocks where a fund has de-
creased their holdings of a stock. Initiations are stocks where a fund went from a position
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of zero to a positive position in the stock since the last report date. Liquidations are stocks
where a fund sold all of their holdings, going from a positive to a zero position in the stock
since the last report date. Pick-ups are stocks where a fund purchased the stock for the first
time over their entire recorded 13F filing history. Therefore, liquidations are a subset of sells,
initiations are a subset of buys, and pick-ups are a subset of initiations.
Table 2.6 provides some intuition for the proportions of each trade type. Column 1 says
that 49.5% of all trades are buys and 50.5% are sells; the balance between buys and sells
should not be surprising. Column 1 also says that about a third of buys are initiation and sell
are liquidations. Notably, taking all initiations, roughly 40% of the time the stock is being
initiated for the first time (i.e: is a pick-up).
Table 2.6: Socially Connected v.s. Non-Connected Trading, Overview
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
All Trades Connected Trades Non-connected
Trades
All Trades 100.0% 0.2% 99.8%
Buys 49.5% 48.0% 49.5%
Initiations 13.4% 8.8% 13.4%
Pickups 5.6% 2.4% 5.7%
Sells 50.5% 52.0% 50.5%
Liquidations 12.7% 7.9% 12.7%
Holdings 100.0% 0.2% 99.8%
This table reports joint summary statistics on the types of trades made by investors and
our social connectivity measure. We count the proportion of stocks bought/initiated/picked
up/sold/liquidated/held by fund managers where a social interaction occurred with an exec-
utive and where one has not.
Columns 2 and 3 require some delicacy. First, the top row says that taking all trades
in our sample of fund managers 1 in every 500 (0.2%) is socially connected. Juxtaposing
columns 2 and 3 for the Buy row suggests that conditional on being connected, a trade is
not much more/less likely to be Buy (48% v.s. 49.5%). The same reasoning holds true for
the Sell row. Connected holding refer to stocks that are currently in fund portfolios and
were initiated during a quarter in which there was a social connection with that stock. The
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inference for this category is empirically the same as that of All Trades.
2.5.3.2 Socially Connected v.s. Non-Connected Trading
We now use standard calendar time portfolios to test the hypothesis that fund managers out
perform on trades induced by social connections. At the end of every calendar quarter stocks
in each fund portfolio (based on the most recent 13F filing) are designated connected or not,
on the basis of social events that transpired during that quarter. Test portfolios based on
these connections are then formed at the start of the subsequent quarter.
So for example, suppose we are studying the subsequent performance of fund initiations
that are coincident with social connectivity. If we are looking fund managers’ initiations
during the second calendar quarter we designate the social events that transpired between
April 1st and June 31st as part of our SocialConnection variable. In this example, the
initiation is based on juxtaposing snapshots made on March 31st and June 31st. As such,
the social events will be aligned with the interval during which the initiation transpires. A
test portfolio that tracks the performance of these connected initiations will then establish
a position from July 1st through September 30th (3rd calendar quarter). Test portfolios are
rebalanced quarterly and are weighted by funds’ dollar holdings (weights always sum to 1).
Table 2.7 presents this section’s key result: fund managers outperform on purchases of
stocks where they attended a social event with firm executives. We report calendar time
excess returns in monthly basis-points. This outperformance is statistically and economically
significant: socially connected purchases (buys/initiataions/pick-ups) earn between 100 and
200 basis-points monthly in raw returns. Whereas their non-connected analogs earn roughly
half that. These returns are robust to controlling for common risk factors; they earn between
60 and 160 basis-points monthly in 4-factor alphas, which is the intercept on a regression of
monthly portfolio excess returns on the monthly returns from the three Fama and French
(1993) factor-mimicking portfolio, and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. The L/S column
is a long short portfolio that is long connected portfolio in a particular category and short the
analogous non-connected portfolio. The magnitude of the long-short test portfolio returns
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are generally large and statistically significant: socially connected purchases outperform non-
connected purchases by between 50 and 130 basis-points monthly in 4-factor alphas. Not
only do connected purchases outperform, but as we would expect connected sells have more
negative returns that their non-connected analogs.
Table 2.7: Socially Connected versus Non-Connected Trading, Abnormal Returns
Raw Return 4-Factor Alpha
All Connected Non-connected L/S All Connected Non-connected L/S
Buys 75.52 113.00 75.72 37.27 8.10 64.03 8.03 56.00
1.28 1.74 1.28 1.02 1.70 1.86 1.65 1.57
Initiations 82.86 223.41 84.74 138.66 7.32 157.72 9.79 147.92
1.31 3.19 1.35 2.87 0.58 3.10 0.84 3.05
Pickups 83.29 214.71 86.36 128.35 7.62 150.33 11.66 138.68
1.32 3.02 1.38 2.40 0.40 2.68 0.65 2.64
Sells 73.48 35.82 74.07 -38.25 8.49 -12.88 8.45 -21.33
1.33 0.64 1.33 -1.37 2.32 -0.50 2.23 -0.78
Liquidations 80.33 48.90 80.40 -31.50 4.68 -14.53 4.71 -19.24
1.25 0.67 1.25 -0.83 0.46 -0.38 0.47 -0.51
Holdings 74.55 116.86 74.53 42.33 8.37 28.19 8.39 19.80
1.30 1.44 1.30 0.82 2.19 0.55 2.20 0.39
This table reports calendar time excess returns (in monthly basis points) on portfolios formed
conditional on fund-firm social connections. At the end of every calendar quarter stocks in
each fund portfolio (based on the most recent 13F filing) are designated as connected or not,
on the basis of social events that transpired during that quarter. Test portfolios based on
these connections are then formed at the start of the subsequent quarter. Test portfolios are
rebalanced quarterly and are weighted by the funds’ dollar holdings. Connected companies
are defined as firms where at least one corporate official attended a social event with a
portfolio manager employed by the fund.
Notably, outperformance is more pronounced in the types of purchases that are likely
triggered by the acquisition of fresh information. Our results are stronger for initiations,
stocks where a fund went from a position of zero to a positive position in the security, and
for pickups (first time initiations). Socially connected initiations outperform non-connected
initiations by between 138 basis-points monthly in raw returns (t=2.87) and by 147 basis-
points monthly in 4-factor alphas (t=3.05).
These economically large returns are unaccompanied by increased levels of risk: the an-
nualized Sharpe Ratio of the portfolio of socially connected initiations is 1.2 compared to 0.5
for non-connected initiations.
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Table 2.8 presents the results of a strategy that forms a long short portfolio that goes
long fund managers’ buys and shorts fund managers’ sells. We then compare the connected
and non-connected specifications of this zero cost portfolio. The key takeaway from table
2.8 is that the zero cost (long short) portfolios of connected Buys v.s. Sells and Initiations
v.s. Liquidations earn statistically and economically significant returns. Focusing on Initia-
tions v.s. Liquidations we see that this portfolio earns 172 basis-points monthly in 4-factor
alphas (t=2.86). On the other hand, the long short portfolio that mimics all fund buys v.s
sells is essentially flat, earning -0.39 basis-points monthly in 4-factor alphas (t=-0.11). Not
surprisingly, the non-connected mimicking portfolio is flat also.
Table 2.8: Predictability of Socially Connected Portfolios, Abnormal Returns
Raw Return 4-Factor Alpha
All Connected Non- L/S All Connected Non- L/S
connected connected
Buys v.s. 2.04 77.18 1.65 75.53 -0.39 76.92 -0.41 77.33
Sells 0.37 1.97 0.31 1.96 -0.11 1.96 -0.12 1.96
Initiations v.s. 2.53 174.51 4.34 170.17 2.65 172.25 5.08 167.17
Liquidations 0.25 2.88 0.47 2.91 0.28 2.86 0.59 2.86
This table reports calendar time excess returns on portfolios formed conditional on fund-firm
social connections. This strategy forms a long short portfolio that goes long fund managers’
buys and shorts fund managers’ sells.
Table 2.9 reports the results of pooled time series regressions of monthly portfolio excess
returns on the monthly returns from the three Fama and French (1993) factor-mimicking
portfolio, and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. First focusing on the long short spread
portfolios of buys v.s sells. The version of this portfolio that consists of all fund manager
buys and sells has pronounced exposures to these common risk factors. Notably beta and
momentum, which is not surprising if we believe that our sample of fund managers are value
investors. That said, these factor exposures are absent in the connected version of this
portfolio. The connected (and L/S) versions of the Initiations v.s. Liquidations portfolio has
a slight size tilt, but its other exposures aren’t noteworthy.
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Table 2.9: Socially Connected Portfolios, Four Factor Regression Loadings
Buys v.s. Sells Initiations v.s. Liquidations
All Connected Non-connected L/S All Connected Non-connected L/S
Alpha 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0077 0.0003 0.0172 0.0005 0.0167
-0.11 1.96 -0.12 1.96 0.28 2.86 0.59 2.86
MKT 0.0326 -0.0223 0.0290 -0.0513 0.0056 -0.2404 0.0023 -0.2427
3.80 -0.24 3.51 -0.54 0.24 -1.66 0.11 -1.73
SMB 0.0321 0.1159 0.0303 0.0856 0.0113 0.5492 -0.0038 0.5530
1.74 0.57 1.71 0.42 0.23 1.77 -0.09 1.84
HML 0.0385 0.1460 0.0453 0.1007 0.0269 -0.2278 0.0303 -0.2581
2.39 0.83 2.93 0.57 0.62 -0.84 0.78 -0.98
UMD -0.0350 -0.1347 -0.0331 -0.1017 0.0756 0.0957 0.0739 0.0218
-4.87 -1.71 -4.79 -1.29 3.94 0.79 4.26 0.19
This table reports 4 factor loadings. That is, the results of a regression of monthly portfolio ex-
cess returns on the monthly returns from the three Fama and French (1993) factor-mimicking
portfolios, and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.
Given our empirical results thus far we believe that the Initiations v.s. Liquidations
spread portfolio is that which is most representative of the phenomenon we are trying to
understand. Figure 2.4 juxtaposes the time series of returns for the connected and non-
connected specifications of this portfolio.
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Figure 2.4: Socially Connected Portfolios, Time Series of Abnormal Returns
This figure depicts the total returns for the connected and non-connected Initiations v.s.
Liquidations portfolio.
Looking at the large alphas particularly on the long side of our socially connected port-
folios raises the obvious question: are socially connected stocks fundamentally different from
the rest of the equity universe (eg: higher return)? For example, perhaps fund managers are
randomly drawing from a static subset of the stock universe that consists of higher return
stocks. If this is true then the portfolio of connected stocks that fund managers choose to
hold should be distinct from those that they do choose not to.
Using the same portfolio construction approach as before, we compute value weighted
returns on test portfolios of connected non-held stocks. Connected non-held stocks are those
stocks where the fund manager had a social interaction with a firm executive during the
quarter but maintained a zero position throughout the quarter. Table 2.10 presents the
returns of test portfolios of connected stocks that fund managers choose not to hold. The
portfolio of connected holdings and connected non-held positions are virtually identical and
have as spread of 2 basis points monthly in 4 factor alphas (t=0.04). Nevertheless, those
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connected stocks in which fund managers chose to initiate positions outperforms the those
that they don’t trade by 120 basis points monthly in 4 factor alphas (t=2.51).
Table 2.10: Non-held Socially Connected Stocks, Abnormal Returns
Raw Return 4-Factor Alpha
Connected Non-Held 78.29 32.95
1.52 2.29
Connected Non-Held v.s. Connected Buys -34.69 -31.12
-1.21 -1.07
Connected Non-Held v.s. Connected Initiations -144.50 -124.24
-2.90 -2.51
Connected Non-Held v.s. Connected Pickups -136.47 -117.48
-2.36 -2.07
Connected Non-Held v.s. Connected Held -40.19 2.00
-0.73 0.04
This table reports calendar time excess returns (in monthly basis points) on portfolios formed
conditional on fund-firm social connections. Connected non-held stocks are those stocks
where the fund manager had a social interaction with a firm executive during the quarter but
maintained a zero position throughout the quarter. Portfolios are value weighted by market
capitalization.
2.6 Propagation of Fund Managers’ Best Ideas
In the previous sections, we studied the effect of social networks on executives and fund
managers jointly. We now ask the obvious next question of whether the information flow
that we document extends to the communication between fund managers. We examine the
extent to which fund managers who attend the same social events tend to herd in their trading
decisions, particularly on their highest conviction ideas.
We assume that when a fund manager attends a social event, that fund becomes connected
to the other managers at that event. To test for herding in a fund manager’s trading of a
particular stock, we define a measure of the extent to which a fund manager’s connected
peers hold that stock as a best idea.
For each fund manager, we measure their social connectivity to a stock by counting the
number of other distinct fund managers with whom they attended a social event and who
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had that stock as a top holding. With our definition, the funds might have had these social
interactions at different events during that quarter. Also, note that more than one individual
might work for a specific fund. As long as employees of two distinct funds interact at a social
event, then the two funds are designated as socially connected for that quarter. We define
best ideas as holdings that are amongst the top 5 in a fund manager’s portfolio by dollar
weight. We adopt a simple best idea aggregation scheme that assigns values proportional to
the number of connected funds that have a stock as their best idea.13
We present an example in order to give intuition for our methodological approach. For
simplicity lets assume in this example that only the top 1 holding is considered to be a best
idea. Consider a fund, which we will refer to as “XYZ Capital”. Suppose that after attending
many social events throughout the quarter XYZ Capital has interacted with 20 other distinct
funds. We say that XYZ is now socially connected to these 20 funds. Of the 20 funds with
which XYZ is connected let’s assume that two funds’ best ideas are stocks A & B. Let’s
assume that the remaining 18 funds all have a third stock, C, as their best idea. We assume
that connected funds discuss their best ideas. And in this example, 90% of connected funds
discussed stock C. From here we predict that XYZ Capital is likely to increase its position
in stock C in the subsequent quarter.
2.6.1 Measuring cross-fund information transfer
We proceed by describing our empirical methodology in detail. For each fund manager f , we
identify all other fund managers that attended the same social events. This yields fund f ’s
set of connected funds, which we denote by Kf,t. For each stock we measure of the degree
to which it is held by these connected funds a best idea. This measure is denoted by cs,f,t.
Our best idea assignments are based on the funds’ dollar holdings as of the beginning of the
quarter. We denote by BESTs,f,t the indicator variable that fund f holds stock s as a best
idea.
For fund f and stock s, we denote by ΣBESTs,f,t the sum total number of instances
13If, on the other hand, a fund has no social events in a particular quarter then our measure of social
connectivity is set to zero for every stock its portfolio.
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where s is a socially connected best idea.
ΣCONNECTEDBESTs,f,t =
∑
fj∈Kf,t
BESTs,fj ,t
Its worth highlighting the distinction here that BESTs,fj ,t is a property of a single stock
that is 1 or 0 depending on the fund’s weight in that stock. Whereas ΣCONNECTEDBESTs,f,t
is a property of the holdings of funds with which a fund is connected. In general, the larger
the value of ΣCONNECTEDBESTs,f,t the more we expect fund f to increase its position
in stock s.
To obtain our final measure cs,f,t we normalize ΣCONNECTEDBESTs,f,t by the total
number of connected best ideas across all stocks.
cs,f,t =
ΣCONNECTEDBESTs,f,t∑
sk
(ΣCONNECTEDBESTsk,f,t)
When we study the effect of cs,f,t on fund managers’ subsequent behavior we face the
subtle identification problem of not knowing if our inferences about cs,f,t are driven by the
social events or by the tendency of cs,f,t to correlate with stocks that have large weights in
any fund’s portfolio. For this reason we also define an anlogous measure across all funds (as
opposed only connected funds). This measure is independent of our social connection data
and serves as a benchmark for cs,f,t by allowing us to correct for any bias that may result
from a stock simply having a large weight in every fund’s portfolio. We define
ΣALLBESTs,t =
∑
fj
BESTs,fj ,t
and
as,t =
ΣALLBESTs,t∑
sk
(ΣALLBESTsk,t)
We perform quarterly fund-stock Fama-McBeth OLS regressions of equity fund manager
trading activity on social event and cross-fund portfolio characteristics. The dependent vari-
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able is changes in fund manager portfolio weights. The key independent variable is cs,f,t, our
proxy for the degree to which a fund’s socially connected peers hold a stock as a best idea.
Since the trading decisions of fund managers could be influenced by a variety of stock specific
characteristics, we include several controls in our regressions. We control for stocks’ past
returns and we control for the possibility that a common investing style may influence results
by controlling for a stock’s market capitalization and book-to-market ratio (Barberis and
Shleifer (2003), Froot and Teo (2008)). RETCurQTR is the return on the stock during the
current quarter and RETPrevQTR is the return on the stock during the preceding quarter.
Table 2.11 presents our main result: when several fund managers attend the same social
event they herd on each others’ “best ideas”
Table 2.11: Propagation of fund mangers’ best ideas, Fama-MacBeth regressions
Dep Variable: Change in portfolio weight dWs,f,t (BPS)
1 2 3
Top 5 Best Idea Socially Connected cs,f,t 14.12 14.08 14.07
3.16 3.15 3.15
Top 5 Best Idea All Funds as,f,t -74.05 -75.23 -82.24
-5.55 -5.66 -5.61
Change in IO dIOs,t 0.97 1.01
4.40 4.54
SIZE 0.02
3.90
BM 0.00
0.19
RETCurQTR -0.04
-2.10
RETPrevQTR -0.14
-6.54
Intercept 0.02 0.01 -0.35
5.48 0.83 -4.06
Notes: This table reports quarterly, fund-stock Fama-McBeth OLS regressions of equity fund
manager trading activity on fund and cross-fund portfolio characteristics:
dWs,f,t = β0 + β1cs,f,t + β2as,t + θXs,f,t + εs,f,t
The units of observation are fund-stock-quarter (s, f, t).
The first specification demonstrates our key result, that fund managers’ trades are pos-
itively related to their socially connected best ideas. In the second specification we control
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for the change in the stock’s overall institutional ownership. Changes in overall institutional
ownership are correlated as expected but does not affect the strength of our result. In the
third specification, we control for SIZE, BM, and returns during the current and previous
quarters. The magnitude and statistical significance of our result remains robust.
Previous research such as (Cohen, Malloy & Frazzini, 2008) has shown that fund managers
that are connected to each other through shared educational backgrounds tend to herd in
their trading decisions, particularly on stocks where they have a social connection to the firm.
Our results hope to add an additional time dimension that is absent in the case of static links
such as school ties.
Finally, to the extent that fund managers in the same industry have correlated hold-
ings and also typically attend the same events, we would expect to observe a significantly
positive point estimate on cs,f,t. This however may have little to do with our measured so-
cial interactions per-se. We disentangle our proposed dynamic connection from potentially
static connections by adding our connection variable lagged by a year as a regressor. If the
connections being picked up by cs,f,t are static in the way that school ties are, the lagged
social connection should still predict changes in portfolio weights. On the other hand, if the
connections being picked up by cs,f,t are dynamic then lagging it by a year should remove
any predictability. In unreported tests we confirm that this is the case by showing that our
effect is robust to including the value of our social connection variable lagged by a year. This
is important as it highlights the crucial time dimension of our result. It rules out alternative
hypotheses where external persistent links drive the documented trading behavior.
2.7 Conclusion
Social networks play an important role in the diffusion of information. However, it is often
difficult to measure, observe and quantify this process. Using a unique database of elite social
events and their attendees, we document evidence of informed trading activity on the heels
of exclusive gatherings. We illustrate that the returns of stocks subsequent to social events
predicts their upcoming earnings surprises; this is true for precisely those events where the
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firm’s corporate officers are in attendance.
This canonical result motivates a detailed inspection of event attendance in order to
help understand the observed return predictability. We find that fund managers that attend
events that are also attended by corporate officers are more likely to purchase stock in that
firm. These fund managers on average increase their portfolio weight by an additional 20-50
basis points (t=3) after the event. We then explore potential reasons for this bias in fund
managers’ trading in these socially connected stocks. We find that the difference in prof-
itability between fund managers’ socially connected trades and their non-connected analogs
is statistically and economically significant. Socially connected initiations outperform their
non-connected analogs by over +150 basis points monthly (t=+2.8). The out-performance
on these executive induced purchases suggests that, superior information gathering ability,
linked to social events, explains fund managers’ bias toward buying socially connected stocks.
Even though fund managers exhibit a bias towards increasing their holdings in socially
connected stocks, we find that when they unwind socially connected positions the decision
is ex-post more profitable than in the case of their non-connected unwinds. Specifically,
connected sells under-perform their non-connected analogs by -20 basis points monthly (t=-
0.78).
A trading strategy that exploits the combination of fund managers’ rebalancing effects has
non-trivial risk-return characteristics. The strategy that buys connected initiations and sells
connected liquidations is economically and statistically significant. And the spread between
the connected and non-connected versions of this strategy has a Sharpe Ratio of 1.2 and is
uncorrelated with typical risk factors.
Lastly, we extend our mechanism by studying interactions taking place between fund
managers. We find that event co-attendance by several fund managers precedes increases in
portfolio-overlap, particularly in their best ideas. This further strengthens our thesis that
casual personal connections are driving the trading patterns that we observe.
The organization of social networks is an important determinant of how information
becomes reflected in stock prices. Our empirical analysis provides insight into the social
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networks of certain market participants and its effect on their behavior. Taken together
our results suggest that casual social interactions are central to the flow of information in
financial markets and are, therefore, essential for building a complete understanding of price
formation.
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Chapter 3
Mean Reversion
3.1 Introduction
Traditional asset-pricing models, such as those based on rational-expectations, dictate that
return predictability is wholly borne out of either risk premia or unanticipated shifts in liq-
uidity. Theories such as the capital asset pricing model, arbitrage pricing theory and the
Fama-French three-factor model require a tautological link between economically meaningful
risk premia and any return predictability that might exist. Such mechanisms can hardly
justify the rapidly increasing catalog of empirical anomalies found in asset price data, espe-
cially those relying entirely on price based signals. Behavioral models, such as those based on
learning, information flow & investor disagreement have been a central development for the
resolution of this apparent incongruence. Placing disciplined constraints on the potentially
unbounded set of deviations from rationality upon which a behavioral model might be built is
crucial. Beyond the generally desired qualities such as parsimony and an ability to generate
new empirical implications, classical works such as DeBondt and Thaler (1995) advocate that
behavioral finance theory should be founded on robust psychological evidence.
In this essay I propose a mechanism whereby information flow, and then subsequent
learning explains the patterns of short horizon momentum and long horizon reversals that
are observed in equity prices. The model’s key departure from rationality is its assumption
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that investors are overconfident; they overestimate the relative precision of signals with which
they are more closely involved. Overconfidence is both prevalent in, and relevant to, financial
markets; DeBondt and Thaler (1995) assert that “perhaps the most robust finding in the
psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.”
My model features a risk-averse investor who begins with a prior distribution about an
asset’s fundamental value that is a simple Gaussian. The investor combines exactly three
sources of information with which she updates her beliefs: her prior distribution, a price-
target for the asset, and news about the asset’s true value. At an initial date the investor
receives a price-target about the value of the asset. Subsequently, the investor’s belief about
the asset’s payoff distribution is shaped by the stream of news which she uses to update her
initial prior distribution. The news is assumed to be a noisy but unbiased measurement of the
asset’s true value. The investor is subject to a well-defined Bayesian filtering problem that,
as I will show, can be profoundly affected by parameter mis-measurement. I show that if the
investor over-estimates the price-target’s relative precision, then she will exhibit a rational
tendency to initially increase her belief in its credibility regardless of whether or not it is
true.
To understand my approach, consider the following example. Suppose that on the basis
of fundamental analysis, an investor constructs a Gaussian prior for the distribution of the
value of a stock. Now suppose a sell-side analyst gives the investor a price-target for the
stock. The price-target, if true, deterministically pins down the value of the stock. As such,
the investor’s prior distribution of the stock’s value goes from being a Gaussian to being a
Gaussian mixture where the mixture components are her prior density and a point-mass at
the price-target.14 If we assume that the price-target is optimistic (above the investor’s prior
mean for the stock’s value) then observation of the price-target will increase the investor’s
perceived value of the stock since she will add some weight to the state of the world in
which the price-target is true. In each subsequent time period the investor observes news,
14The initial relative weight of the price-target component of the investor’s posterior distribution is exoge-
nous - intuitively this will depend on the analyst’s reputation or simply how much the investor believes the
price-target to be true.
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measurements that are the asset’s true value combined with Gaussian noise.
What happens to the investor’s beliefs as she observes news revealing the stock’s true
value? The investor performs model selection on two competing hypotheses: one where the
asset’s value is exactly the price-target, so that the observed news is a noisy measurement of
the price-target, and another model where the asset’s true value is drawn from a distribution
given by the investor’s prior so that the observed news is a noisy measurement of the prior
mean (with a higher variance). The investor then model-averages these hypotheses in order
to form her final beliefs.
Strikingly, if the price-target isn’t too far above the investor’s prior mean then observing
bad15 news can actually cause the investor to rationally increase her overall expectation of
the asset’s value.
To see this, consider what happens when the investor observes news that the asset’s value
is slightly below the investor’s prior mean. The investor updates her beliefs in two distinct
ways: she updates her conditional posterior distribution for the asset’s value conditional on
the price-target being false, and she reevaluates the weight placed on the price-target. The
first part of her updating is easy to conceptualize, the investor forms a conditional posterior
whose mean is a linear combination of her prior mean and the observed news. Thus, her
conditional posterior mean is less that her prior mean if the observed news is less than her
prior mean.
The second part of the investor’s updating asks, by which model the data is more likely
to have been generated. If the price-target is close to the prior mean, then this amounts
to juxtaposing the likelihoods of two Gaussian distributions with similar means but differ-
ent variances. In this case the distribution with the lower variance is often the one more
likely to be the data generating process. When the variance of the investor’s prior is large
relative to the variance of the news, then she will update in favor of the price-target for a
disproportionately large fraction of news that can be observed.
15I refer to good (bad) news as realizations that are above (below) the mean of the investor’s prior distri-
bution.
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Figure 3.1: Non-Representativeness in Bayesian Model Selection
This figure depicts the likelihood of observed news. It compares the investor’s prior distribu-
tion with the likelihood function conditional on the asset’s value being the price-target.
Concretely, suppose the investor’s prior distribution has mean µz and variance vz; and
let G denote the price-target and vε the variance of the normally distributed news shocks.
Observing a news realization that is bad, but not too far below the prior mean, can cause the
latter effect (up-weighting the optimistic price-target) to dominate the former effect (a lower
conditional posterior mean), resulting in an overall increase in the model-averaged posterior
expectation of the asset’s value. A visual depiction of this argument is presented in figure
3.1.
Perturbing this example makes this apparent violation of the representativeness heuristic
even more clear. Suppose now that, instead of observing bad news, the investor observes
news that is exactly equal to her prior mean. Given the assumptions and argument above,
this would result in an even larger degree of up-weighting in favor of the price-target since the
news is now closer to it than before. This new situation emphasizes the fact that the investor
will interpret evidence that is exactly consistent with her prior distribution as instead being
consistent with the price-target being true. I illustrate these points rigorously in section 3.3.
I also highlight the more important finding, that when the investor believes that the news less
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precise than it actually is, on average16 the investor will initially tend to increase her belief
in the price-target, even if it is not true. Nevertheless, if the price-target is not true, then
as the investor continues to observe increasingly more news about the stock, she eventually
down-weights her belief in the price-target towards zero. The initial period of price-target
up-weighting causes short horizon continuation, while the subsequent down-weighting leads
to long horizon reversal as the effect of the price-target diminishes.
I test my theory by juxtaposing realized and option-implied volatility, and show that the
overshooting effect predicted by the model is most pronounced when the market’s perception
of a stock’s volatility consistently exceeds actual volatility. A momentum portfolio strategy
that exploits this effect earns over 80 basis points per month (t=2.6) in factor adjusted alphas.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief back-
ground and literature review. Section 3.3 presents a canonical model of investor beliefs.
Section 3.4 embeds these beliefs in an equilibrium pricing framework and section 3.5 derives
& discusses my central theoretical results. Section 3.6 presents empirical validation of the
model’s predictions and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Setting
This essay relates closely to a broad literature regarding market efficiency. The established
idea of rationally priced securities, which reflect all publicly available information, has found
considerable difficulty in explaining the mounting evidence of return predictability. For ex-
ample, momentum, the tendency of assets to exhibit persistence in their price performance,
has been observed not only in US equity markets (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)), but also in
European and emerging markets (Rouwenhorst (1998)) and a broad spectrum of asset classes
(Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen (2013)). The challenge for traditional risk-based asset-pricing
models is further exacerbated by findings of mean reversion in equities at longer horizons of
3 to 5 years (DeBondt and Thaler, (1985, 1987)). As such, behavioral theories - approaches
that include some sort of pathological behavior - have been advanced as a resolution to this
16Averaging over the less noisy reality
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incongruence. In this vein, several distinct approaches have been set forth to jointly deliver
both short-horizon continuation and long-horizon reversals. For instance, using an individual
representative agent, Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrah-
manyam (1998) assume that price movements are driven by a small collection of cognitive
biases. On the other hand, Hong and Stein (1999) build on the interactions between hetero-
geneous agents to explain the observed return predictability. My approach is somewhere in
the middle, while it assumes a representative agent it is fundamentally more similar to the
model of Hong and Stein (1999).
Empirical documentation of return predictability related to this model falls into two
distinct categories: reversal and continuation. DeBondt and Thaler, (1985, 1987) find that
stocks sorted based on their trailing 3 to 5 year performance tend to mean revert over the
coming 3 to 5 years. There are also equivalent fundamental-reversion patterns observed in
the time series of the aggregate market.
On the other hand, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document persistent out-performance
of past winners over past losers by roughly 100 basis points per month over a horizon of 3 to
12 months. Relatedly, Hong, Lim, and Stein (1999) document that under-reaction in equity
prices is most robust for stocks with low analyst coverage and is more pronounced for bad
news. In terms of timing, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) show that the preponder-
ance of the momentum effect is concentrated around subsequent earnings announcements.
This essay pursues the goal of testing a new unified explanation for both momentum and
reversal phenomena.
This work also relates to another aspect of market efficiency: the implications of asset
volatility for future price dynamics. This is central to my empirical strategy and is discussed
further in section 3.6 in the context of my empirical results.
To summarize, much of the previous work on explaining continuation and reversal patterns
in asset prices are centered on issues such as trend-chasing by traders or fire-sale effects. My
mechanism is distinct from other approaches to return predictability in that it focuses instead
on the issue of an investor learning about the precision of competing signals. In addition
70
to explaining general empirical facts such as short horizon continuation and long horizon
reversal, this model derives sharp predictions for when these anomalies should be relatively
more or less robust.
3.3 A Simple Model With Learning
This model speaks to the expected price dynamics that result as an investor observes new
information. The model’s insights are driven by peculiarities about the way that investors
update their beliefs under certain conditions. A preliminary discourse on this belief updating
is therefore a prerequisite for a coherent exposition of my central results.
This section has three principal goals. First, I present a simplified 2-period example of
belief-updating and use it to orient the reader with some important notation. I will also rig-
orously justify the claim made in the introduction that: if the price-target isn’t too far above
the mean of the investor’s prior, then observing bad news can actually cause the investor to
rationally increase her overall expectation of the asset’s value. Second, I extend my notation
and tools to accommodate multiple time periods. Third, I reformulate the investor’s signal-
selection problem in such a way that the dependency on the model’s parameters becomes
very transparent. In the later sections I will embed these assumptions about beliefs in an
equilibrium pricing framework and study their effects on prices.
3.3.1 A Motivating Example
I proceed by describing a stylized example to motivate my approach. Consider an investor
who begins with the prior that a stock’s fundamental value, z, is normally distributed with
mean µz and variance vz, i.e. z ∼ N (µz, vz). A sell-side analyst tells the investor a price-
target of G, claiming that z = G ≡ µz + κ (without loss of generality, we may assume that
κ > 0). In words, the price-target is optimistic and simply exceeds the investor’s prior mean
by κ. Initially, the investor believes that with probability ω0 ∈ (0, 1) the price-target is true,
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but that with probability 1− ω0 the price-target is completely uninformative17.
The investor’s expectation of the stock’s fundamental value is weighted average of her
prior and the price-target
EI0 [z] = ω0G+ (1− ω0)µz (3.1)
= ω0κ+ µz
The investor then observes a noisy news signal ψ = z+ ε with ε ∼ N (0, vε). The investor
is a Bayesian, and she knows the distribution of ε. How do her beliefs change after she sees ψ?
The investor’s updating task can be recast in the more familiar framework of model-selection,
where “price-target is false” constitutes the first candidate model, and “price-target is true”
constitutes the second. The investor updates her beliefs about the parameters in each model,
and also updates the probabilities that she assigns each model.
From the investors perspective, under the assumption that the price-target is false, beliefs
about z update in the usual manner. She assigns z a posterior normal distribution with the
following moments:
E1 [z|ψ] = µz + vε
vz + vε
(ψ − µz)
V1 [z|ψ] = 11
vz
+ 1vε
= vεvz
vε + vz
Note that I distinguish between the mean of the conditional posterior distribution E [·]
and the combined model average EI [·] by also using the superscript I.
Now, under the assumption that the price-target is true, z has a degenerate prior, so no
updating is necessary.
Next, the investor also updates her prior (ω0) concerning the probability that the price-
17The initial weight ω0 can be thought of as the “reputation” of the individual or institution that is generating
the price-target.
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target is true to the posterior ω1.
The updating of ω lies at the heart of my work, and I explain it in detail. The investor is
faced with a traditional Bayesian model selection problem, she forms a posterior probability
that some model M is true given data D. Bayes theorem dictates that
Pr (M |D) = Pr (D|M)Pr (M)
Pr (D)
In this context M can be thought of as the model where the price-target is true, and D
represents the news. So this can be used by setting,
Pr (M) = ω0
Pr (M |D) = ω1
Pr (D) = Pr (D|True)ω0 + Pr (D|False) (1− ω0)
Bayes rules therefore implies that investors update according to
ω1 =
ω0
(
Pr(D|True)
Pr(D|False)
)
ω0
(
Pr(D|True)
Pr(D|False)
)
+ (1− ω0)
The term given by Pr(D|True)Pr(D|False) is precisely the likelihood ratio or Bayes factor.
Now, if the target is true, then ψ ∼ N (G, vε) ≡ N (µz + κ, vε) and so the likelihood of
observing ψ is
L (ψ|true) = 1√2pivε exp
(
−((ψ − µz)− κ)
2
2vε
)
while if the target is false, ψ ∼ N (µz, vz + vε) and the likelihood of observing ψ is
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L (ψ|false) = 1√
2pi (vz + vε)
exp
(
− (ψ − µz)
2
2 (vε + vz)
)
We define the likelihood ratio
Λ ≡ L (ψ|True)L (ψ|False)
=
√
vz + vε
vε
exp
(
(ψ − µz)2
2 (vε + vz)
− ((ψ − µz)− κ)
2
2vε
)
(3.2)
Applying Bayes’ rule yields
ω1 =
Λω0
Λω0 + (1− ω0) (3.3)
My central results concern the manner in which the presence of the price-target alters the
inferences that the investor makes from new, noisy signals about fundamental value.
Consider the case in which ψ = µz (this both aids intuition and provides the starting
point for my subsequent perturbation arguments). We begin by considering the implications
for ω1. First, note that ω1 > ω0 ⇐⇒ Λ > 1, so we are interested in the conditions that
determine whether or not Λ is greater than unity.
Λ = L (ψ = µz|True)L (ψ = µz|False)
=
√
vz + vε
vε
exp
(
(µz − µz)2
2 (vε + vz)
− ((µz − µz)− κ)
2
2vε
)
=
√
vz + vε
vε
exp
(
− κ
2
2vε
)
Consequently, routine algebraic manipulations show that
Λ > 1 ⇐⇒ vz
vε
> exp
(
κ2
vε
)
− 1 (3.4)
In other words, when the unconditional prior variance of z is sufficiently large relative to κ
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and vε, the signal ψ = µz will lead the investor to strictly increase her belief in the price-
target, that z = µz + k. Moreover, because Λ is monotone increasing with respect to ψ in a
neighborhood of µz, when vz is large, there will be an interval of signals ψ < µz that actually
strengthen the investors belief in the price-target!
A Taylor expansion of the right-hand side of equation (3.4) provides an intuitive picture
of what constitutes a “sufficiently large” vz:
vz
vε
> exp
(
κ2
vε
)
− 1
≈ 1 + κ
2
vε
− 1
Therefore, to a first-order approximation (literally), the condition for the perverse rein-
forcement of the price-target is merely
vz > κ
2
that the standard deviation of fundamental value exceeds κ, the difference between the
target and the original expectation. Stated differently, we need the price-target to be within
a standard deviation of the prior mean.
Now, upon observing some ψ < µz, the investor lowers the value of z that she expects if
the price-target is false. More rigorously,
E1 [z|ψ] = µz + vε
vz + vε
(ψ − µz)
Although the investor may increase the weight she puts on the price-target being true, it is
not obvious which effect will dominate in his expectation of z averaged across both models.
By analogy to equation (3.1), this cross-model average is
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EI1 [z] = ω1 (µz + κ) + (1− ω1)
(
µz +
vz
vz + vε
(ψ − µz)
)
It can be shown that the change in the overall expectation EI1 [z] − EI0 [z] is given by the
following expression:
EI1 [z]− EI0 [z] =
( 1− ω0
Λω0 + (1− ω0)
)(
ω0κ (Λ− 1) + vz
vz + vε
(ψ − µz)
)
(3.5)
If we fix some vz satisfying vzvε > exp
(
κ2
vε
)
− 1 then it is assured that the entire term
ω0κ (Λ− 1) > 0. Now, let ψ tend towards µz from below, it becomes clear that EI1 [z]−EI0 [z]
will be greater than zero for some ψ < µz. This result reveals a very profound peculiarity
that a little bit of bad news causes an investor to increase their overall valuation of the stock.
Figure 3.2 depicts the value of EI1 [z]− EI0 [z] for various values of ψ. I assume that µz =
50, G = 55, vz = 200, vε = 300 and ω0 = 0.518. The key takeaway from figure 3.2 is that for
values of ψ ∈ [48.69, µz] the investor’s model-averaged expectation increases (EI1 [z] > EI0 [z]).
This is implied from the figure since the dashed green line (EI1 [z] > EI0 [z]) crosses above zero
before ψ reaches µz.
I address the matter rigorously in section 3.5, but intuitively it is obvious that the preced-
ing perturbation results can translate into a tendency for the investor to increase the weight
that she places on the price-target in expectation over all news realizations.
Observe that since ψ is distributed symmetrically about µz (integrate over z), and there
exists some number δ > 0 such that values of ψ in the interval (µz − δ, µz) cause the investor
to increase ω, it follows that the investor will increase ω for more than half of the ψ’s drawn.
Establishing that the average initial change in ω exceeds zero is more challenging, but as I
show in section 3.5, this result will hold under some additional mild assumptions.
18These are the same parameter values as those in the example in the introduction (figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.2: Effect of Observed News on Model-Averaged Expectation
This figure depicts the change in the investor’s model-averaged expectation of the asset’s
payoff for various values of ψ. Here I assume that µz = 50, G = 55, vz = 200, vε = 300 and
ω0 = 0.5.
3.3.2 The Information Environment
The process by which investors refine their beliefs about asset payoffs is now considered in
generality. I assume that investors have a constant stream of normally distributed news which
they use to rationally update their estimates about z. Specifically, once z is drawn (before
the start of the model) there is a constant stream of news at dates t ≥ 1, which is denoted
by Ψt. It is assumed that Ψt = z + εt where εt ∼ i.i.d. N (0, vε) and εt is independent of z
for all t. Let the realized value of Ψt be denoted by ψt.
The two-period results in the previous section extend immediately to this multi-period
setting through iteration. Only the notation changes. At time t, the analogues of µz and
vz are Et−1 [z] and Vt−1 [z], respectively. For convenience, note that these quantities are
updated upon the arrival of each new ψ as follows:
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Et [z] =
vεEt−1 [z] + Vt−1 [z]ψt
vε + Vt−1 [z]
Vt [z] =
vε
vε + Vt−1 [z]
Vt−1 [z]
This is conveniently written as,
Et [z] =
µz
vε
t +
1
t
(∑t
s=1 ψs
)
vz
vε
t + vz
Vt [z] =
vε
t vz
vε
t + vz
To avoid confusion, I label the conditional likelihoods and the likelihood ratios with time
subscripts hereafter.
Next, I examine the investor’s model selection problem. Consider the her information-set
at the start of date-t: if the signal is true then
Ψt ∼ N (G, vε)
however if it is not then
Ψt ∼ N (Et−1 [z] , vε + Vt−1 [z])
These hypotheses yield the following prior densities respectively,
Lt (ψt|True) = 1√2pivε exp
(
−(ψt −G)
2
2vε
)
Lt (ψt|False) = 1√2pi (vε + Vt−1 [z])exp
(
− (ψt − Et−1 [z])
2
2 (vε + Vt−1 [z])
)
The likelihood ratio is defines as,
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Λt =
Lt (ψt|True)
Lt (ψt|False)
And in this case substitution yields,
Λt =
√
1 + 1
vε
Vt−1 [z]exp
(
vε (ψt − Et−1 [z])2 − (vε + Vt−1 [z]) (ψt −G)2
2 (vε + Vt−1 [z])
)
Bayes rule implies that at date-t investors update their estimate that the signal is true
according to,
ωt =
Λtωt−1
Λtωt−1 + (1− ωt−1) (3.6)
It follows directly that
Λt > 1⇐⇒ ωt > ωt−1
3.3.3 Tractable Bayesian Updating
It is convenient to work with expressions that relate to key model parameters in a simple and
intuitive way. The goal of this section is to establish an alternative expression for ωt that is
convenient and depends transparently on the parameter ω0.
When faced with news, the investor uses equation 3.6 to determine ωt as a function of
ωt−1. This formula is inconvenient because ω0 is a parameter of the model but all subsequent
values ωt≥1 are determined recursively. It is useful to reformulate the Bayesian updating rule
in equation 3.6 in a manner that is directly anchored to ω0 .
First, observe that plugging in the expression for ωt−1 yields
ωt =
ΛtΛt−1ωt−2
ΛtΛt−1ωt−2 + 1− ωt−2
Iterating equation 3.6 by repeated substitution (t times) yields,
ωt =
∏t
k=1 Λk−1ω0∏t
k=1 Λk−1ω0 + (1− ω0)
(3.7)
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Equation 3.7 is anchored at ω0 however without further simplification the term
∏t
k=1 Λk−1
makes the effect of news difficult to study. Although brute force algebra can yield a useful
factorization of ∏tk=1 Λk−1, I instead take a more intuitive approach to making the model
more tractable.
The investor’s model-selection update rule can be reformulated by considering the problem
faced at date-t assuming that she has her date-0 prior distribution. After all, there is no path
dependency in the determination of ωt; clearly an investor that observes a sequence of ψt in-
turn will arrive at the same value of ωt as an investor that observes all of this data at once.
In fact, the average value of the news realizations is a sufficient statistic for the sequence of
realizations. Recall the assumption that the news Ψt = z + εt where εt ∼ i.i.d. N (0, vε) and
εt is independent of z for all t. Observing the cumulative average of the news realizations for
the first time at date-t simply results in a single dose of more precise news.
In this case the investor observes
1
t
t∑
s=1
Ψs = z +
(
1
t
t∑
s=1
εs
)
where
1
t
t∑
s=1
εs ∼ N
(
0, vε
t
)
I define Θt to be the random variable obtained by taking the cumulative time-average of
the publicly available news up to and including date-t.
Θt =
1
t
t∑
s=1
Ψs
Let θt denote the realized value of Θt. Since Ψt = z+εt we have that Θt = z+ 1t
∑t
s=1 εs.
Now, consider the investor’s sequential updating problem through the lens of the “one-
shot” updating problem at date-t starting from date-0 information.
If the signal is true then Ψt ∼ N (G, vεt ) which yields the following prior density for θt
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L˜t (θt|True) = 1√
2pi
(vε
t
) exp
(
−(θt −G)
2
2
(vε
t
) )
If on the other hand, G is irrelevant, then Ψt ∼ N (µz, vεt + vz) which yields the following
prior density for θt
L˜t (θt|False) = 1√
2pi
(vε
t + vz
)exp
(
− (θt − µz)
2
2
(vε
t + vz
))
This alternate construction yields a likelihood ratio Λ˜t (anchored to ω0) that is given by,
Λ˜t =
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
)
exp
−vzt
(
θt −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2vε (vε + vzt) /t
+ (µz −G)
2
2vz

I use the tilde ·˜ above the terms L˜t and Λ˜t to distinguish between this construction, based
on Θt, and the original updating contruction based on Ψt.
The final belief updating equation, anchored at ω0 is given by,
ωt =
Λ˜tω0
Λ˜tω0 + (1− ω0)
(3.8)
The values of ωt dictated by equation 3.6 are identical to those obtained by using equation
3.6.
3.4 An Equilibrium Pricing Framework
In this section, I embed my multi-period information environment in an equilibrium asset
pricing framework. In its entirety my modeling approach consists of two key ingredients: a
model of how investor beliefs evolve, and a theory of investor preferences. The former was
developed in section 3.3 and I now turn to discussion of the latter.
I begin by first describing assets and investor preferences. I assume there are two assets, a
risky stock and a risk-free asset. The stock is available in fixed supply which is normalized to
unity and the risk-free asset is available in perfectly elastic supply with a return normalized
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to zero.
The fundamental value V of the stock is wholly determined by the random variable
denoted by z.
V = z
The value of z is drawn at date-0, before the model begins, and is distributed normally
with mean µz and variance vz. That is, when evaluating the risky asset, the investor cares
about only about a single stochastic quantity z, and that quantity has a payoff distribution
that is the prior distribution described in section 3.3.
The market is comprised of a unit mass of individuals with constant absolute risk aver-
sion (CARA) utility over the value of final wealth. This classic pairing of CARA utility
with normally distributed returns has become the canonical model in the behavioral finance
literature. It’s popularity is driven largely because it results in tractable demands and prices
as each investor maximizes mean-variance utility over final wealth given by
U(Wt+1) = Et[Wt+1]− γ2Vt[Wt+1] (3.9)
Thus far, these asset-pricing assumptions are completely orthodox.
3.4.1 Risk & Return with CARA Normal Mixtures
As discussed in section 3.3, an investor observes a price-target G that she incorrectly initially
believes is informative about the value of the stock. I study the expected price dynamics
that result as investors gradually realize that the price-target lacks predictive power. For
simplicity I begin this section by focusing on the mixture distribution that the investor has
at date-0 before she has observed any news however no generality is lost since at time t, the
analogues of µz and vz are Et−1 [z] and Vt−1 [z], respectively.
From the investor’s perspective, the distribution of z is not normal but is instead amixture
of normals. This mixture distribution is comprised of a normal N (µz, vz) (the prior) and a
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point-mass N (G, 0), where each has weights 1− ω0 and ω0 respectively. That is,
V =

G ω0
N (µz, vz) 1− ω0
Unlike with normal distributions, when an asset-payoff distribution of this form is combined
with CARA preferences it does not imply that investors maximize mean-variance utility and
care only about the distribution’s first two moments. Instead investors maximize a more
involved functional form for utility. This is explored below.
Definition 3.1. For a random variable, X, the moment-generating function MGF (t) and
cumulant-generating function CGF (t) are defined by
MGF (t) = E[exp(tX)]
CGF (t) = log(MGF (t))
∀ t such that E[exp(tX)] <∞.
Given the setup described above, the general problem of maximizing the expected value
of terminal wealth can be written down as maxx E[U(Wt+1)] or E[U(Wt+xϕ)] where ϕ is the
stochastic excess return generated by investing in the risky asset. CARA utility is given by
U(Wt+1) = −e−γWt+1 and as shown by Davila (2011), the objective function of an investor
with CARA utility can be written as minxCGFθ˜(−γx) since,
max
x
E
[
−e−γWt+1
]
⇐⇒ min
x
logE
[
e−γ(Wt+xθ˜)
]
⇐⇒ min
x
logE
[
e−γxθ˜
]
⇐⇒ min
x
CGF (−γx)
where x denotes the number of shares of the risky asset demanded.
With these results in hand I now consider the MGF (t) of this asset’s payoff distribution.
Since the asset’s payoff distribution is a mixture, it follows that probability density function
is a linear combination of functions.
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It follows that,
MGF (t) = E[exp(tz)]
= ω0E[exp(tG)] + (1− ω0)E[exp(tN (µz, vz))]
Intuitively, the moment-generating function is obtained by evaluating the expectation of
a point mass in proportion ω0
ω0E[exp(tG)] = ω0etG
and a log-normal distribution in proportion 1− ω0
(1− ω0)E[exp(t · N (µz, vz))] = (1− ω0) eµzt+ 12vzt2
Combining these terms yields
MGF (t) = (1− ω0) eµzt+ 12vzt2 + ω0etG
From here the equilibrium price is obtained by evaluating the logarithm of the above
expression at t = −γx and then maximizing with respect to the number of shares x
To start, set aside the delineation of the asset’s price from its expected payoff. The
investor minimizes the following quantity
CGF (−γx) = log (E[exp(−γxX)])
Substituting in the expression for theMGF (t) derived above yields an optimization prob-
lem that is given by,
min
x
log
[
(1− ω0) e−µzγx+
γ2
2 vzx
2 + ω0e−Gγx
]
(3.10)
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Now, let the price of the asset be denoted by P0. Imposition of the price is simply a
mean-shift of the asset’s payoff distribution by −P0 and the optimization problem becomes,
min
x
log
[
(1− ω0) e−(µz−P0)γx+
γ2
2 vzx
2 + ω0e−(G−P0)γx
]
(3.11)
The first order condition is obtained by simply differentiating the minimand and setting
the result to zero. The first order condition is given by
(
−γ (µz − P0) + γ2vzx
)
(1− ω0) e−(µz−P0)γx+
γ2
2 vzx
2 − (G− P0) γω0e−(G−P0)γx = 0 (3.12)
Equilibrium demand is obtained by re-arranging equation 3.12 and isolating terms involv-
ing x. It follows that equilibrium demand is given by
x = µz − P0
γvz
+ G− P0
γvz
(
ω0
1− ω0
)
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
x−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2− (µz−G)22vz ] (3.13)
Note that, unlike in the usual CARA normal case, this expression is non-linear since the
number of shares demanded appears on both sides of this expression.
What does this expression for equilibrium demand imply?
This equation makes intuitive sense. First, observe that since 0 < ω0 < 1 we have
ω0
1− ω0 ∈ [0,∞]
The term
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
x−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2− (µz−G)22vz ]
may also be written as
e
−
[
(G−µz)γx+ γ
2x2vz
2
]
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This makes clear the fact that if G > µz, then,
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
x−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2− (µz−G)22vz ] = e−
[
(G−µz)γx+ γ
2x2vz
2
]
∈ [0, 1]
since
(G− µz) γx+ γ
2x2vz
2 > 0
This term can be thought of as an inflation factor relative to the CARA normal case.
As certainty in the price-target ω0 −→ 1, demand x −→ ∞ since the asset becomes
risk-less and has a positive payoff of G. As certainty in the price-target ω0 −→ 0 then the
demand x = µz − P0γvz which is just the simple CARA normal case.
Assuming that G = µz, the mean of the asset’s payoff distribution is µz and the variance
is (1− ω) vz < vz. This yields,
x = µz − P0
γvz
(
1 +
(
ω0
1− ω0
)
e−
γ2
2 vzx
2
)
>
µz − P0
γvz
Therefore this asset is strictly preferred to one whose payoffs are distributed normally
with mean µz and variance vz19.
To better understand the influence that the price-target has on equilibrium demand,
consider following example. Figure 3.3 plots demand for various values of the price-target
while holding other parameters fixed. I assume that P0 = 50, µz = 50, vz = 100, γ = 0.001.
I plot values of x (y-axis) for values of G (x-axis) between 50 and 100. I repeat the exercise
for ω0 ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
The central takeaway from figure 3.3 is that x is non-monotonic and bounded in G. If
the investors prior mean µz is kept fixed, then increasing G does not boundlessly cause her
demand to increase.
At high values of G the investor demands what she would if she believed the asset pay
19Intuitively, the tails of the mixture are thinner since it “places some extra mass” at the mean.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of the Price-Target on Equilibrium Demand
Plot of the effect of the price-target on equilibrium demand. The parameters are P0 =
50, µz = 50, vz = 100, γ = 0.001, 50 < G < 100 and ω0 ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}
off is distributed according to her prior distribution. That is, even though increasing G
unambiguously increases the investor’s expectation of the asset’s payoff, there is a point
beyond which increases in G cause the investor to demand less.
This non-monotonicity in G occurs because at higher levels of G the investor’s aversion to
the even moments of the asset’s payoff distribution overwhelms her preference for increases
in the mean and other odd moments. To see this intuition, consider the fact that the variance
of the investor’s mixture distribution is given by
(1− ω0)
(
vz + (G− µz)2 ω0
)
and its mean is given by
(1− ω0)µz + ω0G
For any linear combination of the two, having a negative weight on the variance and
a positive weight on the mean, there exists a value of G (or µz) beyond which the linear
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combination becomes negative as long as either G or µz is kept fixed. Higher moments
can be paired off in successive odd-even pairs to generalize this intuition. If G and µz are
increased simultaneously then the investor’s demand increases monotonically.
The equilibrium price is considered next. Since the supply of the risky asset is fixed at
unity, the equilibrium price is obtained through market clearing by setting x = 1 and solving
equation 3.13 for P0. This yields,
P0 =
(µz − γvz) (1− ω0) +Gω0e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2− (µz−G)22vz ]
(1− ω0) + ω0e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2− (µz−G)22vz ] (3.14)
What does this expression for the equilibrium price imply?
It is worth pausing to comment on a few features of the expression for the equilibrium
price. The price combines the price-target with the price if investors had CARA normal
preferences based on her prior distribution. The weights on each component are dependent
on both µz and G. This price is larger that the CARA normal case if the price-target is
above it.
As the belief in the price target ω0 −→ 0 it follows that
P0 −→ µz − γvz
since the asset’s payoff distribution is again a simple Gaussian.
To better understand the influence that the price-target has on equilibrium prices, consider
following example. Figure 3.4 plots the price for various values of the price-target while
holding other parameters fixed. I again assume that µz = 50, vz = 100, γ = 0.001.
Because the equilibrium supply of the asset is normalized to 1, extreme values of G must
be plotted in order to illustrate its effect. I plot values of P0 (y-axis) for values of G (x-axis)
between 50 and 5000. I repeat the exercise for ω0 ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. Again, we see here that
the investor’s aversion for even moments overwhelms when µz is kept fixed and G is large.
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Figure 3.4: Effect of the Price-Target on Equilibrium Prices
Plot of the effect of the price-target on equilibrium demand. The parameters are µz =
50, vz = 100, γ = 0.001, 50 < G < 500 and ω0 ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}
3.4.2 Price Dynamics
What happens to prices as investors consume news?
Now, equation 3.14 specifies the price at date-0 before any news is released. It is directly
extended to determining the equilibrium price in future time periods by setting µz = Et [z]
and vz = Vt [z].
This yields,
Pt =
(Et [z]− γVt [z]) (1− ωt) +Gωte
−
[
γ2
2 Vt[z]
(
1−
(
Et[z]−G
γVt[z]
))2
− (Et[z]−G)22Vt[z]
]
(1− ωt) + ωte
−
[
γ2
2 Vt[z]
(
1−
(
Et[z]−G
γVt[z]
))2
− (Et[z]−G)22Vt[z]
] (3.15)
To make notation more concise I write Pt as
Pt =
(1− ωt)pit + ωtλtG
(1− ωt) + ωtλt (3.16)
where
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pit = Et [z]− γVt [z]
and
λt = e
−
[
γ2
2 Vt[z]
(
1−
(
Et[z]−G
γVt[z]
))2
− (Et[z]−G)22Vt[z]
]
I refer to the term pit as the risk adjusted payoff and I refer to λt as simply a price inflation
factor.
3.4.3 Absence of the Price-Target
Now that equilibrium pricing has been specified, I provide some intuition about the types
predictions made by the model that hinge on the presence of price-targets.
Since ωt = Λ˜tω0Λ˜tω0+(1−ω0) then ω0 = 0 implies that ωt = 0 ∀t ≥ 1. Therefore, the influence
of the price-target can be removed from the model by setting ω0 = 0. Under these conditions
Pt = pit
= Et [z]− γVt [z]
Since as shown in section 3.3
Et [z] =
µz
vε
t +
1
t
(∑t
s=1 ψs
)
vz
vε
t + vz
Vt [z] =
vε
t vz
vε
t + vz
Direct substitution yields,
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Pt = µz
vε
t
vε
t + vz
+
(
1
t
t∑
s=1
ψs
)
vz
vε
t + vz
− γ
vε
t vz
vε
t + vz
= (µz − γvz)
vε
t
vε
t + vz
+
(
1
t
t∑
s=1
ψs
)
vz
vε
t + vz
Therefore, in the absence of the price-target, the investor simply aggregates observed
news 1t
∑t
s=1 ψs and combines it with the mean-variance µz − γvz valuation driven by her
prior.
How do prices behave on average?
In order study the behavior of Pt - on average - one needs to take expectations over news
realizations. Only some terms are stochastic,
Pt =
Deterministic︷ ︸︸ ︷
(µz − γvz)
vε
t
vε
t + vz
+
Stochastic︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1
t
t∑
s=1
ψs
)
vz
vε
t + vz
Now since
1
t
t∑
s=1
ψs ∼ N
(
z,
vε
t
)
Conditional on z, taking expectations over news ( ψ ) yields
Eψ [Pt] = (µz − γvz)
vε
t
vε
t + vz
+ z vzvε
t + vz
Now consider what is observed unconditionally. I assume that z ∼ N (µz, vz). Taking
expectations over the fundamental value z yields,
Ez
[
Eψ [Pt]
]
= µz − γ vεvz
vε + vzt
(3.17)
Prices are low initially since this is when uncertainly is largest regarding the asset’s payoff
distribution. As news is consumed, uncertainty is resolved. Since investors are risk averse
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium Price Dynamics in the Absence of the Price-Target, Simulations
Plot of the unconditional expected path of prices, EZ
[
Eψ [Pt]
]
, for parameter values µz =
vz = γ = 1 and vε ∈ {0.5, 1.0 . . . 4.5, 5.0}
prices will increase. The effects of the various parameters can be directly interpreted. The
investor’s prior mean µz is simply a vertical shift in Pt. Increasing risk aversion γ causes
initial prices to be lower but results in a more pronounced increase in prices as uncertainty is
resolved. Increasing vz has two effects: in the numerator it influences the price in the same
way as risk aversion and in the denominator it is like increasing the effect of time.
The interesting parameter in this context is vε. The role played by vε in this formula is
intuitive: decreasing vεmeans that news is more precise, this causes prices to increase more
rapidly once news is observed but but unlike the other parameters it does not affect the initial
price. To provide some intuition figure 3.5 illustrates the time-series dynamics of Pt for a set
of example parameters ( µz = vz = γ = 1 ) and for a grid of vε ∈ {0.5, 1.0 · · · 4.5, 5.0} equally
spaced between 0.5 and 5 in 0.5 increments. That is, each line represents a different value of
vε but all specifications have µz = vz = γ = 1.
Figure 3.5 and equation 3.17 both highlight the simple fact that in the absence of the
price-target the equilibrium price never overshoots its long-run value µz. Stated differently,
in the absence of the price-target, the model never generates any negative serial correlation
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in returns at any horizon.
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3.5 Expected Returns
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 develop a model that links news, investor beliefs and equilibrium prices.
The question asked in this section is: What types of price regularities, if any, does the model
embed? Or put differently, should an econometrician studying a market governed by this
model expect to observe any return predictability?
In order to answer these questions I examine the behavior of the model’s equilibrium
price, in expectation. I begin with a numerical example. To start, recall that, as a function
of observed news, the equilibrium market price is given by,
Pt =
(1− ωt)pit + ωtλtG
(1− ωt) + ωtλt
For simplicity, I restrict my attention to what occurs at date-1 when the investor observes
news ψ1. I begin with a simple numerical example to build intuition about how the investor’s
estimates about volatility impacts prices. I assume that the price target is false and that
G = 60, µz = 50, γ = 0.06, vz = 175, vε = 300 and ω0 = 0.7. These values are summarized in
table 3.1.
Table 3.1: An Example of date-1 Equilibrium Prices, Parameters
Parameter Value
G 60
µz 50
γ 0.06
vz 175
vε 300
ω0 0.7
First, I consider date-0. Under these assumptions we have that,
λ0 = e
−
[
(60−50)0.06+ (0.06)21002
]
= 0.226
pi0 = 50− 0.06 · 175 = 39.5
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which implies
P0 =
(1− 0.7) · 39.5 + 0.7 · 0.226 · 60
(1− 0.7) + 0.7 · 0.226 = 45.93
Next, consider prices at date-1. Figure 3.6 plots P1 as a function of ψ1 and the model
parameters.
Figure 3.6: Date-1 Prices as a Function of News
This figure plots date-1 price as a function of news. Here I assume that G = 60, µz = 50, γ =
0.06, vz = 175, vε = 300 and ω0 = 0.7.
We see that P1 is monotonically increasing in ψ1, which makes intuitive sense. We also
see from figure 3.6 that if ψ1 = µz, then P1 > µz. In words, if the investor observes news that
is exactly equal to the mean of her prior distribution, then the equilibrium price increases.
This occurs for two reasons. The first is reason is that when the investor observes ψ1 this
resolves some uncertainty about the asset’s payoffs. As such, the asset becomes less risky
from the investor’s perspective. The second and more important reason is that the investor
actually increases her overall belief that the price target is true. Specifically, we have that
Λ0 = 1.065 > 1
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which implies that
ω1 =
1.065 · 0.7
1.065 · 0.7 + 1− 0.7
= 0.7133
> 0.7
= ω0
In this case, both the reduction in uncertainty and the increased belief in the price target,
tend to increase the price at date-1. In order to transparently see how these two forces influ-
ence the equilibrium price change between date-0 and date-1, I examine a single expression
for the asset’s return.
Define price returns as
Rt = Pt − Pt−1
It can be shown that this expression for returns is given by 20,
Rt =
1− ωt
1− ωt (1− λt)
[
∆pit + (G− pit−1) (λtΛt−1 − λt−1) ωt−11− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)
]
(3.18)
where
∆pit = pit − pit−1
and
∆λt = λt − λt−1
Setting t = 1, equation 3.18 reduces to
20See appendix for proof. The term involving Λ1−1 appears in this equation by making use of ωt+1 =
Λtωt
Λtωt+(1−ωt) ⇐⇒
ωt−ωt−1
(1−ωt) = ωt−1 (Λt−1 − 1)
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R1 =
1− ω1
1− ω1 (1− λ1)

Change in risk−adjusted payoff︷︸︸︷
∆pi1 +
Change in belief in price−target︷ ︸︸ ︷
(λ1Λ0 − λ0) (G− pi0)ω01− ω0 (1− λ0)
 (3.19)
In equation 3.19 the term ∆pi1 is given by
∆pi1 = (E1 [z]− γV1 [z])− (E0 [z]− γV0 [z])
and captures changes in the asset’s risk-adjusted payoff, from the investor’s perspective,
conditional on the price-target being false. Looking at the second term, I note that
(G− pi0)ω0
1− ω0 (1− λ0) > 0
Special attention should be paid to the expression (λ1Λ0 − λ0), which reflect the degree
to which the investor increases, ω0, her belief that the price-target is true. I will also show
later that in general λ1 ≈ λ0 so the sign of the term (λ1Λ0 − λ0) literally reduces to the sign
of (Λ0 − 1). To the extent that the price-target G exceeds the investor’s ex-ante risk-adjusted
payoff pi0, the price of the asset will definitely increase if (Λ0 − 1) > 0. This is captured by
the term (G− pi0) in equation 3.19.
In this numerical example, the values of these two terms are
∆pi1 ≈ 3.86
(λ1Λ0 − λ0) (G− pi0)ω01− ω0 (1− λ0) ≈ 8
Thus, in this example, when ψ1 = µz the price change is indeed driven by an increase in
beliefs in the price-target.
Next, I consider expectation of the price at date-1. Since the conditional distribution of
ψ1 is
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ψ1 ∼ N (z, vε)
and the distribution of fundamentals is
z ∼ N (µz, vz)
it follows that the unconditional distribution of ψ1 is given by
ψ1 ∼ N (µz, vε + vz)
The unconditional distribution of ψ1 is symmetric and has a mean of µz. And since P1 is
monotonically increasing in ψ1 and P1 (ψ = µz) > µz it follows that in this example for more
than a half of the ψ1drawn an increase in P1 will be observed. To further build intuition, in
figure 3.7, I re-plot figure 3.6 and juxtapose the values of P1 with the probability density of
ψ1 plotted on the right-hand axis.
Figure 3.7: Probability of Observing News and Prices
This figure plots date-1 price as a function of news. Here I assume that G = 60, µz = 50, γ =
0.06, vz = 175, vε = 300 and ω0 = 0.7.
Now consider the numerical values from the example. When the distribution of ψ1 is
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N (50, 175+300), as assumed, numerical integration shows that the expectation of the date-1
price is given by,
Eψ1 [P1] ≈ 49.64
Let vTotal = vε + vz denote the total unconditional variance of ψ1. Looking at figure 3.7,
it is clear that a decrease in vTotal corresponds graphically to an increase in the “peakedness”
of the news distribution around µz. Since P1 > µz at ψ1 = µz, there is a (small) value of
vTotal > 0 such that under that assumption of total variance, the unconditional expectation
of P1 is greater that µz.
As an example, suppose the actual distribution of the news shocks has a variance vε|True
that is a quarter of what the investor believes (vε|True = vε6 = 50). This yields,
Eψ(vε|True)1 [P1] ≈ 50.72 > µz
The price is above the investor’s prior mean.
Now consider how the expected price changes in later periods. As the investor consumes
an arbitrarily large amount of news, over many time periods, Vt [z] → 0 and Et [z] → µz
therefore pit → µz. If G is assumed to be false, then ωt → 0 and taken together this
means that Pt → µz. In this particular example, µz = 50. This implies, that this example,
where vε|True = 50 and vε = 300, prices unconditionally overshoot their long-term value, in
expectation. After initially overshooting, prices revert toward µz as additional information is
observed. The effect on price changes caused by the investor’s beliefs about the variance of
the news, compared to reality, is made transparent in this example.
Finally, if the investor’s assumption about vε is then shifted from 300 to be 50 (now in
line with reality) and expectations are taken where vε|True = vε = 50, then the expectation
of P1would go back down to ≈ 49.65. In the next section I discuss the precise conditions that
lead to expected overshooting in prices.
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3.5.1 General Return Dynamics
I now provide some general insight into the conditions under which the documented over-
shooting effect is most pronounced. I illustrate that if investors believe that the unconditional
variance of the news (vε + vz) is larger than it is in actuality, then prices will generally over-
shoot their long term values. To start, I continue to focus on date-1 and to assume that
G > µz.
Now, the price inflation factor λt plays a minor role - recall that it is given by
λt = e
−
[
(G−Et[z])γ+ γ
2Vt[z]
2
]
and so when investors are near risk neutral the value of this term is always approximately
1. For convenience I make one simplifying assumption, that the price inflation factor λ1, λ0 ≈
1 since, as I will later explain, has little effect on time series dynamics.
Next, I rewrite equation 3.23 as
Eψ1 [P1 − µz] = Eψ1 [ω1] (G− µz) + Eψ1 [(1− ω1) (pi1 − µz)] (3.20)
The first term, Eψ1 [ω1] (G− µz), is unambiguously positive. Next, if the true variance of
the news distribution (that we are taking expectation over) tends toward zero then we have
Eψ1 [(1− ω1) (pi1 − µz)] = [(1− ω1) (pi1 − µz)]ψ=µz
= − (1− ω1 (ψ = µz)) γvεvz
vε + vz
which is small if investors are near risk neutral (i.e.:γ small).
Therefore,
Eψ1 [P1 − µz] ? 0
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when investors overestimate the variance of the news distribution.
Next, I establish that this overshooting effect will still be observed event if the price-
target is only correct a proportion 1 − ω0 of the time. Conditional on a date-0 draw of z,
the distribution of ψ1 ∼ N (z, vε). Now, suppose some value of z is drawn. Conditionally,
the long term price is ultimately z. If the price target is correct, then G = z, and so the
difference between the date-1 price and its long term value is
Eψ1 [P1 − z| z] =
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
Eψ1 [ω1 (z − z)| z] + Eψ1 [ (1− ω1) (pi1 − µz)| z] (3.21)
If the price target is not correct, then the difference between the date-1 price and its long
term value is
Eψ1 [P1 − z| z] = Eψ1 [ω1 (G− z)| z] + Eψ1 [ (1− ω1) (pi1 − µz)| z] (3.22)
I continue to assume, without loss of generality, that when the price-target is incorrect that
G > µz and that γ is small. Taking the two cases in equations 3.21 and 3.22, in proportions
ω0 and (1− ω0) respectively, and substituting in for pi1, yields a combined expectation of
(1− ω0)Eψ1 [ω1 (G− z)| z] + Eψ1
[
(1− ω1) vz
vε + vz
(z − µz − γvε)
∣∣∣∣ z]
This combined expectation is a function of the realized draw of z. The extend of price
overshooting is described by taking the expectation of this expression over z ∼ N (µz, vz). If
the final unconditional variance of ψ is unexpectedly small in actuality, then this expectation
approaches the case where ψ = µz. And with G > µz this expectation is positive. Therefore,
when the actual unconditional variance of ψ is sufficiently small, prices overshoot in aggregate.
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3.5.2 A Heuristic for Return Predictability
A useful heuristic for the intensity of overshooting is the investor’s expected increase in ωt.
To see this intuition observe that the expectation of the price minus its long term value can
also be written as
Eψ1 [P1 − µz] = Eψ1 [ω1 (G− pi1)]− γ
vεvz
vε + vz
(3.23)
Next, observe that (G− pi1) ≥ (G− pi0) ≥ (G− µz) = 0. Therefore, we see from equation
3.23 that the sign of Eψ1 [P1 − µz] is influenced by investor’s expected change in beliefs, Eψ1 [ω1].
Next, I examine the factors influencing the expected change in the investor’s belief that
price-target is true.
In the discourse that follows I drive a wedge between what investors believe about news
uncertainty and what news uncertainty actually is. Recall that investors are assumed to
believe that the news shocks ψ are unconditionally distributed normally with mean µz and
variance vε + vz. I now consider what happens if the news shocks actually have variance21
vε|True 6= vε. This assumption changes the variance assumed when taking expectations, not
the variance assumed inside the investor’s likelihood function. Recall that ω1 = Λ0ω0Λ0ω0+(1−ω0) ,
where Λ0 depends on ψ1.
Taking expectations over news shocks, it follows trivially that
Eψ1
[
ω1
ω0
]
> 1 ⇐⇒ Eψ1
[ Λ0
Λ0ω0 + (1− ω0)
]
> 1
Under what conditions is Eψ1
[
ω1
ω0
]
> 1?
Since functions of the form f(x) = 1/(ax+b) are convex, if the expression above is instead
rewritten as
Eψ1
 1
ω0 + (1− ω0)
[
1
Λ0
]

21The “|True” subscript in vε|True is unrelated to the truth or falsity of the price-target G. It refers to
the truth in that it represents the actual variance of the news shocks (whereas vε is the variance assumed by
investors).
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then Jensen’s Inequality implies that
Eψ1
[ Λ0
Λ0ω0 + (1− ω0)
]
>
1
ω0 + (1− ω0)Eψ1
[
1
Λ0
]
The lower bound on the right hand side exceeds 1 if
Eψ1
[ 1
Λ0
]
< 1
This expectation is given by22
Eψ1
[ 1
Λ0
]
= vε√
v2ε + vz
(
vε − vε|True − vz
) exp
1
2
(µz −G)2
(
2vz + vε + vε|True
)
v2ε + vz
(
vε − vε|True − vz
)

From here it is clear that the conditions for Eψ1
[
1
Λ0
]
< 1 are
(µz −G)2
vz
<
v2ε + vz
(
vε − vε|True − vz
)
2vz + vε + vε|True
log
v2ε + vz
(
vε − vε|True − vz
)
vε

and vε − vε|True > vz. In words, this means that if there is a sufficiently large gap
between how noisy investors believe the news is and how noisy the news actually is, and the
price-target is not too far from the prior mean, then Eψ1
[
ω1
ω0
]
> 1.
3.5.3 A Numerical Simulation
To get oriented with the phenomena that this model captures, consider the following illus-
trative numerical example. Consider how conditional price dynamics look when news is more
precise than assumed.
22See appendix for proof
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Table 3.2: An Example of Equilibrium Price Dynamics, Parameters
Parameter Value
G 2.25
µz 1.5
γ 0.15
vz 4.5
vε 5
vε|True 0.5
ω0 0.4
Suppose the mean of the fundamental value µz and the value drawn z are both equal to
1.5, and that the variance of the fundamental value vz, is 4.5. Let the price-target G be 2.25.
The assumed variance of the news vε, is believed to be 5 but vε|True is in fact 0.5 and investors
initially believe that the price-target has a 40% chance of being true (ω0 = 0.4). Risk aversion
is γ is 0.15 Taken together, these assumptions result in an initial price of ≈0.9. To simulate
what happens on average, news streams ψt =
z︷︸︸︷
1 + εt are repeatedly drawn according to
εt ∼ N(0,
vε|True︷︸︸︷
0.5 ) and the dynamics of the average price path is then studied. Given the
parameters described above and in Table (3.2) the resulting expected price dynamics are
depicted Figure (3.8).
104
Figure 3.8: An Example of Equilibrium Price Dynamics
We see that the path of the expected belief in the price-target (ωt) is non-monotonic.
Values are set start out at 0.4 but increases to over 0.6 within the first 20 time periods. As
more news is released, beliefs fall and ωt eventually dips below 0.56 by about 50 time periods.
The equilibrium price starts off below its long-term value µz because of risk aversion. The
initial pronounced increase in ωt causes Pt to overshoot its long term value before finally
decreasing towards it.
A crucial assumption driving the price-overshooting in this numerical example is the wide
gap between vε and vε|True that was selected. In the next section I demonstrate that this
dynamic is observable in stock prices. By mapping the parameters of the model to real
world quantities I isolate portfolios that are more likely to exhibit these patterns of return
predictability.
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3.6 Empirical Results
In this section I test several empirical predictions of the model. The theoretical results
outlined in the previous section suggest that the difference between realized return variation
and the market’s expectation of return variation is central to understanding when return
predictability is strongest. Specifically, my model dictates that the wedge between actual
news uncertainty (vε|True) and what investors believe about news uncertainty (vε) is of central
interest for studying return predictability.
Linking these ideas to reality, the parameters assumed by the investor in the model can
be thought of as the views of the marginal price setter. In complete arbitrage-free markets
a unique risk-neutral measure exists which equates asset prices to the discounted expected
value of their future payoffs. Under this measure, the probabilities assigned to states of
the world capture the risk preferences of the marginal price setter. To the extent that
market participants believe that news variance is vε 6= vε|True the magnitude of an asset’s
volatility implied by the risk-neutral measure will reflect this belief. However, in reality
market participants are subject to news shocks with their own properties, not what investors
believe. Therefore identifying when realized volatility (physical-measure) diverges from the
assumed level of volatility (risk-neutral measure) provides the ability to determine when and
for which stocks the model’s predictions should hold.
Stock options are both highly liquid and have a well understood theory linking their prices
to the volatilities of their underlying stocks. The difference between the expected risk-neutral
variance and physical variance is often referred to as the variance risk premium. This essay
relates to a strand of the literature focused on the extent to which option markets contain
information that is distinct from what is reflected in stock prices. For example, Bollerslev,
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2011) study the information content
of the equity variance risk premium at an aggregate level. At the level of single stocks,
Carr and Wu (2008) and Buraschi, Trojani and Vedolin (2014) document cross sectional
variation. Of these, the one most closely related to this essay is Buraschi, Trojani and
Vedolin (2014). In studying the cross-sectional and time-series variations in the variance
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risk premia of individual stocks, they link the variance risk premium to belief disagreement
among investors. In addition, they derive testable implications for this relationship. Their
conceptualization of “belief disagreement” is closely connected to my notion of overconfidence.
As such, equity options provide an ideal setting for extracting risk-neutral volatility estimates
to study the model’s implications.
The theoretical results in section 3.5 illustrate that stocks for which the marginal investor’s
wedge in beliefs is wide will have a tendency to exhibit short-term momentum and long-term
reversion. In this sense the model dictates that momentum and reversion are driven by
investors who do not update sufficiently to news. Even if investors initially have a good sense
of how often price-targets are correct, they further increase their belief that it is true, in
expectation.
This insight motivates my empirical strategy. I proxy for the gap in investor beliefs and
in doing so identify a subset of stocks for which return predictability should be most robust.
To test this prediction I use the spread between option-implied and realized volatility as a
separating variable when constructing momentum portfolios. I show that portfolios where
this spread is wider (narrower) produce relatively larger (smaller) factor-adjusted momentum
alphas. Further, as predicted by the model, the larger alphas subsequently reverse more
violently as prices revert to fundamentals.
Heuristically, both option-implied and realized volatility account for additional variation
associated with an asset’s fundamental uncertainty (vz). However the difference between
option-implied and realized volatility provide a clean link to the notion captured by vε−vε|True
within the model.
I proxy for vε − vε|True using the spread between option-implied and realized volatility
(IVt − RVt). I am interested in isolating stocks that consistently rank among the highest in
terms of IVt −RVt23. While there is evidence suggesting that stock volatility is predictable,
views on how this predictability should be modeled is decidedly mixed (see Bollerslev, et al
23RVt is measured over the past 30 days and IVt is computed by interpolation across calls and puts and
over the first 4 standardized tenors (30,60,180,240 days). However, the final measure is completely unaffected
by these choices.
107
(1992)). While investors might be able to predict a stock’s volatility on over long horizons,
it is plausible that over a horizon of several months they may have substantial forecasting
errors. I design my measure to capture deviations a horizon of roughly 3 years. I create a
simple (trailing) monthly measure that captures precisely this. Each day I sort the stocks
in the cross section according to IVt − RVt to obtain daily percentiles. I then compute the
trailing average daily percentile over the past month for a stock24. Wherever I refer to “
IVt −RVt percentile” I am referring to this trailing 1 month average.
The measure described above is likely to be correlated with a variety stock-specific char-
acteristics that are unrelated to my theory. As such, I additionally control for firm size, book
to market, and several other factors by performing monthly cross sectional regressions that
orthogonalize the raw measure to these controls. I perform my main analysis of studying
momentum portfolios using both the raw and the orthogonalized (residual) measure.
3.6.1 Data & Summary Statistics
Before proceeding further it is useful to review the data used to perform my empirical tests.
I use data obtained from several sources. Stock returns and firm characteristics between
January 1990 and December 2013 are obtained from the CRSP and COMPUSTAT database
respectively. Sell-side analyst coverage is taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimates
System (I/B/E/S). Option-implied volatility is obtained from Optionmetrics.
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics on the stocks contained in my sample. The primary
bottleneck for data availability is the existence implied-volatility data for stocks in Option-
metrics. In Panel A I report the coverage of the firms in my data as a fraction of the universe
of CRSP common stocks. On average the universe of stocks in this study comprises roughly
40% of the stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ between 2000 and 2012. Nev-
ertheless, stocks that do have options are skewed towards larger firms. As such, my stock
universe on average contains over 90% of the total market capitalization of common stocks
traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.
24The averaging over 3 years excludes the most recent month to mitigate any potential predictability that
might arise from having very timely data. This does not affect my results.
108
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Stocks with Traded Options, Time Series 2000-2012
Year StockCoverage
Percentage
of Stocks
Percentage of
Market Value
2000 1,534 26% 89%
2004 1,755 38% 91%
2008 1,841 44% 87%
2012 2,183 61% 95%
Panel B: Stock Sub-sample Characteristics
Size percentile 73%
Book-to-market percentile 40%
Momentum percentile 53%
This table presents summary statistics for stocks covered in my sample.
Panel B presents sample firm characteristics compared to all NYSE stocks. We see that
the sample is not biased in any particular direction of the momentum universe but is skewed
towards large cap glamor stocks.
3.6.2 Measuring Overestimation of News Uncertainty
I proceed by presenting empirical results that provide a sense of how IVt−RVt correlates with
several important stock characteristics. Table 3.4 reports coefficients from Fama–MacBeth
regressions of raw IVt −RVt percentiles on a set of firm-specific regressors.
109
Table 3.4: Measuring News Uncertainty Overestimation, Fama-Macbeth Regressions
Dep Variable: IVt −RVt percentile
1 2 3 4 5
BETA -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-6.84) (-6.81) (-6.65) (-7.44) (-7.39)
BM -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-54.79) (-50.09) (-52.01) (-48.63) (-49.37)
SIZE -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(-94.92) (-93.55) (-94.59) (-77.36) (-78.66)
RETt−1,t−6 -0.03 -0.02
(-13.59) (-12.55)
RETt−1 -0.01 0.00
(-2.27) (-1.25)
RETt−2,t−12 -0.02 -0.02
(-12.03) (-11.70)
IDIOVOL 0.60 0.59
(19.51) (19.22)
TURN -4.63 -3.97
(-14.25) (-12.03)
NASD*TURN 4.49 4.28
(11.50) (10.80)
ANALYSTCOVER 0.00 0.00
(5.05) (5.31)
INTERCEPT 1.55 1.55 1.56 1.52 1.53
(136.21) (134.26) (135.28) (111.99) (113.38)
R2 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37
This table reports coefficients from Fama–MacBeth regressions of IVt − RVt percentile on a
set of firm-specific regressors.
In table 3.4 BETA is the coefficient on market excess return from monthly regressions
of daily excess returns on the three Fama and French factors and the Carhart momentum
factor. BM is the log of the book-to-market ratio which is the Compustat book value of
equity divided by the market value of equity; BM is computed as of the June of the previous
calendar year following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). SIZE is the log of
the firm’s market value of equity as of the previous calendar month. RETt−1 and RETt−1,t−6
are the past one and six month stock returns respectively. RETt−2,t−12 is the prior-year stock
return excluding the past month. IDIOVOL is the standard deviation of the residuals from
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a monthly regression of daily excess returns on the three Fama and French factors and the
Carhart momentum factor. TURN is the average turnover in the previous 12 months and
NASD is a NASDAQ dummy. ANALYSTCOVER is the number of analysts that cover the
stock as of the previous calendar month. Cross-sectional regressions are run every month.
t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates. Specifications that include RETt−1,t−6
are set to exclude RETt−1 and RETt−2,t−12 since the latter 2 regressors roughly span the
former.
Table 3.4 tells us that higher values of IVt − RVt are generally associated with smaller,
lower beta stocks that have lower book to market values. This is consistent with the literature
on variance risk premia which highlights a tendency for variance swap strikes to exceed
realized variance in more idiosyncratic and obscure firms25.
3.6.3 Baseline Momentum Portfolios
I begin by examining the performance of a canonical momentum strategy restricted to the
dates and stocks for which I am able to compute IVt − RVt percentiles. This will serve as
a baseline for further results. For momentum, following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) I use
the simple measure of the past 6 month cumulative raw return on the asset.26
Table 3.5 presents factor adjusted alphas and annualized Sharpe ratios for rolling portfo-
lios computed using 6 month returns. Specifically, at the beginning of every calendar month,
stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their previous 6 month’s cumulative raw
returns. The return ranked stocks are assigned to 5 quintile portfolios (columns Q1 through
Q5). Stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced
every calendar month to maintain value weights. The column L/S presents the results for
going long the stocks in the 5th momentum quintile and selling short the stocks in the 1st
momentum quintile.
To obtain these alphas regressions are performed where the dependent variable is the
25The root cause is however generally attributed to risk based explanations.
26Results are slightly weaker but qualitatively similar to those obtained using the 12-month cumulative raw
return on the asset and skipping the most recent month’s return as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
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Table 3.5: Momentum Portfolios, Monthly Alphas 2000-2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Raw Spread 107.05 94.50 90.08 88.66 94.78 -12.26
(1.52) (1.90) (2.15) (2.26) (1.90) (-0.23)
CAPM Alpha 71.23 68.08 67.66 67.84 72.08 0.85
(2.11) (3.43) (4.27) (4.35) (2.33) (0.02)
Fama-French Alpha 52.82 43.24 38.58 34.21 30.28 -22.54
(1.57) (2.33) (3.08) (3.08) (1.38) (-0.47)
Four Factor Alpha 63.26 47.98 40.06 32.87 25.79 -37.48
(2.80) (3.25) (3.32) (3.08) (1.34) (-1.19)
Five Factor Alpha 53.24 38.00 32.16 26.88 26.38 -26.86
(2.36) (2.66) (2.74) (2.56) (1.35) (-0.85)
Sharpe Ratio 0.41 0.51 0.58 0.61 0.51 -0.06
This table reports annualized Sharpe ratios and factor adjusted momentum alphas for un-
conditional cross sectional sorts restricted to the test universe.
monthly excess return of the rolling strategy defined above. The explanatory variables are
the monthly returns from the Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, the Carhart
momentum factor and the Pastor Stambaugh liquidity factor. The holding period for the
rolling strategy is one month. Alphas are in monthly basis points, t-statistics are shown in
perenthesis below the coefficient estimates.
Table 3.5 highlights the basic fact that the momentum “factor”, as defined above, per-
formed poorly (raw spread of -12 basis points (t=-0.23)) during the sample window (2000-
2013) for stocks that have traded options.
These momentum portfolios establish a baseline for test assets. I proceed to my primary
analysis concerning news uncertainty overestimation which predicts that stocks for which
IVt − RVt ranks highest (lowest) in the cross section should exhibit more (less) pronounced
momentum.
3.6.4 Conditional Momentum Portfolios
Table 3.6 reports monthly alphas for the main test assets. At the beginning of every calendar
month stocks are first ranked according to their trailing 3 year average IVt−RVt percentiles.
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Subsequent to this pre-ranking, stocks in each IVt − RVt quintiles are then independently
ranked in ascending order on the basis of their most recent 6 month cumulative raw returns
(momentum). The momentum ranked stocks are assigned to 5 quintile sub-portfolios. Panels
A and B of table 3.6 consider each the 5 return-based quintile sub-portfolios for the highest
(Q5) and lowest (Q1) quintiles by IVt−RVt. Portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month
to maintain value weights.
The columns labeled L/S report the result of going long the stocks in the 5th momentum
quintile (winners) and selling short the stocks in the 1st momentum quintile (losers).
Table 3.6: Effect of Raw News Uncertainty Overestimation on Momentum Alphas
Panel A: High Raw IVt −RVt percentile
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Raw Spread 112.83 69.98 64.86 109.18 126.06 13.23
(1.48) (1.11) (1.15) (1.97) (2.01) (0.24)
CAPM Alpha 76.12 38.66 36.04 83.35 99.49 23.37
(1.82) (1.21) (1.35) (2.54) (2.31) (0.44)
Fama-French Alpha 58.82 15.06 4.64 43.72 62.68 3.85
(1.50) (0.52) (0.21) (1.92) (2.20) (0.07)
Four Factor Alpha 68.65 20.96 7.58 42.98 57.77 -10.88
(2.17) (0.83) (0.36) (1.88) (2.22) (-0.28)
Five Factor Alpha 65.94 7.11 2.48 44.81 63.54 -2.40
(2.05) (0.29) (0.11) (1.93) (2.41) (-0.06)
Sharpe Ratio 0.40 0.30 0.31 0.53 0.54 0.06
Panel B: Low Raw IVt −RVt percentile
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Raw Spread 93.18 96.83 80.47 70.59 52.28 -40.90
(1.53) (2.31) (2.20) (2.08) (1.23) (-0.82)
CAPM Alpha 62.59 75.23 61.49 53.22 32.85 -29.74
(2.09) (3.94) (3.81) (3.35) (1.26) (-0.65)
Fama-French Alpha 47.25 58.61 37.75 30.45 -5.22 -52.47
(1.58) (3.56) (3.12) (2.72) (-0.23) (-1.15)
Four Factor Alpha 56.18 61.43 38.77 29.06 -9.98 -66.16
(2.68) (4.08) (3.26) (2.71) (-0.50) (-2.09)
Five Factor Alpha 45.20 57.00 35.13 24.57 -6.66 -51.86
(2.18) (3.75) (2.93) (2.29) (-0.33) (-1.65)
Sharpe Ratio 0.42 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.33 -0.22
This table reports annualized Sharpe ratios and factor-adjusted alphas for momentum port-
folios formed conditional on raw IVt −RVt percentiles.
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Separating stocks according to their IVt − RVt quintiles results in notable differences in
subsequent momentum. Table 3.6 illustrates that a momentum strategy that focuses solely on
the trading of high IVt−RVt stocks earns above average returns of +24 basis points monthly
in 5 factor alphas (t=0.66) , while a strategy that trades low IVt−RVt stocks earns a negative
5 factors alpha of -45 basis points monthly (t=-1.35). This is precisely the variation in return
that my model predicts.
As highlighted earlier, the IVt−RVt percentile measure is likely to be related to a variety
stock specific characteristics that are unrelated to my theory. Table 3.4 removes correlation
with various controls. Specifically, specification 4 in table 3.4 performs monthly regressions
of raw IVt − RVt percentiles on market beta, book-to-market size, trailing 6 month returns,
idiosyncratic volatility turnover and analyst coverage. Using the residuals from this regression
specification I repeat the exercise performed in table 3.6, of constructing portfolios each
month. Table 3.4 examines the effect of residual, as opposed to raw, values of IVt − RVt
percentiles on the performance of the baseline momentum strategy.
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Table 3.7: Effect of Residual News Uncertainty Overestimation on Momentum Alphas
Panel A: High Residual IVt −RVt percentile
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Raw Spread 60.24 67.69 65.48 84.10 90.44 30.20
(0.81) (1.21) (1.36) (1.75) (1.60) (0.54)
CAPM Alpha 23.19 38.92 40.28 59.79 65.86 42.67
(0.60) (1.53) (2.01) (2.57) (1.77) (0.82)
Fama-French Alpha 11.01 16.82 12.52 25.96 27.89 16.88
(0.29) (0.71) (0.70) (1.41) (1.10) (0.33)
Four Factor Alpha 21.56 22.28 14.57 24.56 23.15 1.59
(0.78) (1.12) (0.85) (1.35) (1.02) (0.04)
Five Factor Alpha 16.11 10.83 11.38 22.12 27.23 11.12
(0.57) (0.55) (0.65) (1.19) (1.18) (0.30)
Sharpe Ratio 0.22 0.33 0.37 0.47 0.43 0.15
Panel B: Low Residual IVt −RVt percentile
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Raw Spread 135.09 112.68 94.83 97.70 76.06 -59.04
(1.85) (2.15) (2.16) (2.26) (1.42) (-1.09)
CAPM Alpha 98.56 86.48 71.87 76.21 52.67 -45.89
(2.70) (3.30) (3.83) (3.46) (1.50) (-0.93)
Fama-French Alpha 66.88 46.10 37.93 31.77 -3.52 -70.40
(1.93) (1.99) (2.47) (1.95) (-0.14) (-1.42)
Four Factor Alpha 76.63 50.94 39.24 29.86 -8.32 -84.95
(2.98) (2.53) (2.60) (1.90) (-0.37) (-2.41)
Five Factor Alpha 69.31 40.07 38.12 23.93 -2.70 -72.01
(2.67) (2.02) (2.48) (1.52) (-0.12) (-2.03)
Sharpe Ratio 0.50 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.39 -0.30
This table reports annualized Sharpe ratios and factor-adjusted alphas for momentum port-
folios formed conditional on residual IVt −RVt percentiles.
In this set of tests stocks are first ranked on based on their residual IVt−RVt percentiles
each month. Stocks in each residual IVt − RVt quintile are then independently ranked in
ascending order on the basis of their most recent 6 month cumulative raw returns (momen-
tum). The primary sorting variable is now cross-sectionally uncorrelated with firm size, book
to market and several other factors by performing cross sectional regressions that orthogo-
nalize the raw measure.
Notably, this new decreased correlation with the auxilliary regressors increases the perfor-
mance of the conditional momentum strategy. Separating stocks according to their residual
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IVt−RVt quintiles induces economically and statistically significant differences in subsequent
momentum. Table 3.7 illustrates that a momentum strategy that focuses solely on the trading
of high residual IVt−RVt stocks earns above average returns of +31 basis points monthly in
5 factor alphas (t=0.84) , while a strategy that trades low IVt −RVt stocks earns a negative
5 factors alpha of -45 basis points monthly (t=-1.35). These effects on returns also align with
the theory and are notably more pronounced.
Given these results it is more convenient to isolate just a handful of individual portfolios
that characterize core effect. That is precisely what is performed in the next set of results.
Table 3.8 reports monthly alphas for portfolios obtained by going long the high IVt − RVt
momentum portfolio and short the low IVt−RVt momentum portfolio. In terms of the results
up to now, this is equivalent to buying the L/S column in panel A and selling the L/S column
in panel B in tables 3.6 or 3.7.
Table 3.8: Net Effect of Variation in News Uncertainty Overestimation
Factor Adjusted Alpha of L/SHIGH − L/SLOW
Raw IVt −RVt percentile Residual IVt −RVt percentile
Raw Spread 54.13 71.10
(1.59) (2.37)
CAPM Alpha 53.10 72.41
(1.55) (2.41)
Fama-French Alpha 56.32 69.35
(1.60) (2.24)
Four Factor Alpha 55.28 67.75
(1.57) (2.19)
Five Factor Alpha 49.46 62.98
(1.39) (2.01)
Sharpe Ratio 0.43 0.64
This table reports annualized Sharpe ratios and factor-adjusted alphas for a momentum-
hedged strategy that buys and sells momentum portfolios conditional on raw or residual
IVt −RVt percentiles.
Unsurprisingly the core effect has highly statistically significant alphas using both residual
and raw IVt − RVt and under various factor models. For example, column 2 of table 3.8
illustrates that a “hedged” momentum strategy that buys high residual IVt−RVt momentum
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portfolios and hedges out its momentum exposure by selling the low residual analog earns
returns of over +70 basis points monthly in factor adjusted alphas (t=+2.4). Juxtaposing
columns 1 and 2 of table 3.8 also demonstrates that this effect is robust to the extent that it
persists with or without orthogonalization.
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Figure 3.9 depicts the cumulative returns of momentum-hedged portfolios formed condi-
tional on raw and residual IVt−RVt percentiles, my proxy for news-uncertainty overestimation
by investors. This is a graphical depiction of table 3.8. Portfolios are formed by purchasing
high raw or residual IVt − RVt momentum portfolios and hedging out their momentum ex-
posures by selling their low residual analogs. The key takeaway from figure 3.9 is that these
alphas appear robust from a time-series perspective. Returns do not accumulate in short
bursts, which if they did, could serve as evidence alternatives to our theory.
Figure 3.9: Cumulative Performance of “News Uncertainty Overestimation” Hedged Portfo-
lios
This figure depicts the cumulative returns of momentum portfolios formed conditional on
both raw and residual IVt −RVt percentiles.
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3.6.5 Reversion to Fundamentals
If the momentum patterns observed in the previous sections are in fact driven by news
uncertainty overestimation then I would expect these profits to reverse sharply after several
months.
Figure 3.10: Event Time Cumulative Returns to Momentum Portfolios
This figure depicts the cumulative event time returns for momentum portfolios based on sorts
conditional on residual IVt −RVt percentiles.
Figure 3.10 depicts the cumulative event time returns over the first 12 months for the
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high and low residual (IVt −RVt percentile) momentum portfolios. In line with the model’s
predictions, we see that the momentum portfolio formed based on high IVt−RVt reverses after
about 10 months whereas the low analog is relatively unchanged in its downward trajectory27.
3.7 Conclusion
In this essay I link the existence of mental-models of price-targets to asset return predictabil-
ity. I present a behavioral explanation for the patterns of continuation and reversion observed
in equity prices. My model features in investor who begins with a simple Gaussian prior dis-
tribution and a price-target about the value of the stock. The price-target is either true, in
which case it resolves all uncertainty about the asset’s value, or it is not true, it which case it
is completely unrelated to the value of the asset. Uncertainty is then subsequently resolved
as a stream of news is consumed.
The central insight of the model is that overconfidence, mistakes about the amount of
uncertainty in one’s information environment, creates a perverse tendency to initially update
in favor of mental-models that are inconsistent with observed data. Specifically, I demonstrate
that even if the price-target is useless, given its binary true/false nature there is a tendency
to up-weight it initially which causes equilibrium prices to overshoot their long term value.
This overshooting results in short term positive auto-correlation followed by negative return
auto-correlations at long horizons.
In addition to explaining general empirical facts such as short-horizon continuation and
long-horizon reversal, this model derives sharp predictions for when these anomalies should
be relatively more or less robust. The model’s predictions are tested by juxtaposing realized
and option-implied volatility in single stocks. A momentum portfolio strategy that exploits
this effect earns over +70 basis points per month in factor adjusted alphas (t=2.6).
Taken together these results illustrate that mis-calibration about an investor’s information-
environment can lead to inefficiencies in the path taken when learning whether or not one
possess private information, and in turn significantly distort the way that news is impounded
27Recalling that the baseline momentum returns are negative on this window, this is expected.
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into securities prices.
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Chapter 4
Appendices
4.1 Chapter 1 Appendix
4.1.1 Asymmetric Reactions to Common Information Shocks
I investigate how limited attention impacts the way in which the same piece of information
is incorporated into the prices of different firms. To do this I consider two sets of firms
that are both subject to common information shocks. The only difference is that investors
pay more attention to one set of firms than another. Using this differential in investor
attention, I demonstrate that attention constraints can result in substantial cross-asset return
predictability. In particular, I examine information events that affect an entire industry. If
investor inattention is driving the return predictability we observe then we would expect news
that affects an entire industry to be impounded into the prices of high attention stocks first.
As such, the price response of high attention stocks to (the industry component of) earnings
news should predict subsequent returns in low attention industry peers.
To test my approach I decompose industry news to obtain an information rich component
that is able to predict subsequent stock returns. Each month, for each industry j, I construct
a measure of aggregate industry news, INDNEWSj,t, by taking a value weighted average of
the earnings surprise of the stocks in that industry.
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INDNEWSj,t =
∑
s∈INDj
EARNSURPs,tvws,j
Every month this measure is constructed for each of the 48 industries in the Fama and
French classification scheme. Using my proxy for investor attention I am then able to de-
compose industry news into a predictive component based on high attention stocks and an
uninformative component based on low attention stocks.
INDRETj,t =
∑
s∈INDj
HIGH ATTN
XRETs,t−1vws,j +
∑
s∈INDj
LOW ATTN
XRETs,t−1vws,j
=
Informative industrymomentum︷ ︸︸ ︷
INDRETHIGH ATTNj,t +
Uninformative industrymomentum︷ ︸︸ ︷
INDRETLOW ATTNj,t
Here I present monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) forecasting regressions of one month
ahead excess return on decomposed industry news and a set of firm specific characteristics.
Specifically, I control for well-known determinants of stock returns, such as size, book-to-
market ratio, momentum, 1-month reversal, idiosyncratic volatility and turnover.
I find that the value weighted average earnings surprise of a stock’s high attention industry
peers strongly predicts its future excess returns whereas the returns of the low attention peers
does not. This is consistent with my hypothesis that investors’ limited information processing
capacity can cause delays in revelation of common information in assets prices, generating
cross asset predictability.
Panel B presents pooled forecasting regressions of industry portfolio returns on decom-
posed industry news, lagged industry portfolio returns and a set of industry aggregates of
stock characteristics. Columns 1 through 4 show the results of regressions in which the de-
pendent variable is the value weighted average return of the entire industry. We see that
consistent with my predictions, only the high attention industry portfolio predicts future
industry returns.
Columns 5 through 12 present 2 important facts consistent with my underreaction story.
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First, the low attention industry portfolio exhibits far more predictability than the high
attention industry portfolio. This is observed by the larger and statistically significant coef-
ficients on INDRETt−1 and INDNEWSHIGH ATTNt in column 12 compared to the smaller
and statistically insignificant coefficients columns 8. Additionally, the high attention news
component predicts the low attention portfolio however the low attention news component
does not predict the high attention portfolio.
Panel C further demonstrates that this predictability is also generated by attention de-
compositions of past industry returns.
INDNEWSj,t =
∑
s∈INDj
HIGH ATTN
EARNSURPs,tvws,j +
∑
s∈INDj
LOW ATTN
EARNSURPs,tvws,j
=
Informative industry news︷ ︸︸ ︷
INDNEWSHIGH ATTNj,t +
Uninformative industry news︷ ︸︸ ︷
INDNEWSLOW ATTNj,t
4.2 Chapter 3 Appendix
4.2.1 A Motivating Thought Experiment
Likelihood ratio calculations
Λ ≡ L (ψ|true)L (ψ|false)
=
√
vz + vε
vε
exp
(
(ψ − µz)2
2 (vε + vz)
− ((ψ − µz)− κ)
2
2vε
)
Inequality conditions and approximation
125
Λ ≡ L (ψ|true)L (ψ|false)
=
√
vz + vε
vε
exp
(
(ψ − µz)2
2 (vε + vz)
− ((ψ − µz)− κ)
2
2vε
)
1 <
√
vz + vε
vε
exp
(
− κ
2
2vε
)
1 > vε
vε + vz
exp
(
κ2
vε
)
vε + vz > vε exp
(
κ2
vε
)
vz > vε
(
exp
(
κ2
vε
)
− 1
)
vz
vε
> exp
(
κ2
vε
)
− 1
≈ 1 + κ
2
vε
− 1
≈ vz > κ2
Investor’s expectations, averaged across models
EI0 [z] = ω0S + (1− ω0)µz
= ω0κ+ µz
EI1 [z] = ω1 (µ+ κ) + (1− ω1)
(
µz +
vz
vz + vε
(ψ − µz)
)
EI1 [z]− EI0 [z] = (ω1 − ω0) (µ+ κ) + (ω1 − ω0)µz + (1− ω1)
vz
vz + vε
(ψ − µz)
= (ω1 − ω0)κ+ (1− ω1) vz
vz + vε
(ψ − µz)
= ω0 (1− ω0)
( Λ− 1
Λω0 + (1− ω0)
)
κ+ 1− ω0Λω0 + (1− ω0)
(
vz
vz + vε
)
(ψ − µz)
=
( 1− ω0
Λω0 + (1− ω0)
)(
ω0κ (Λ− 1) + vz
vz + vε
(ψ − µz)
)
Algebraic manipulations of ω0 and ω1
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ω1 =
Λω0
Λω0 + (1− ω0)
ω1 − ω0 = Λω0Λω0 + (1− ω0) − ω0
= ω0
( Λ
Λω0 + (1− ω0) − 1
)
= ω0
(Λ− Λω0 + ω0 − 1
Λω0 + (1− ω0)
)
= ω0
((Λ− 1)− ω0 (Λ− 1)
Λω0 + (1− ω0)
)
= ω0 (1− ω0)
( Λ− 1
Λω0 + (1− ω0)
)
= ω0 (1− ω0)
( Λ− 1
Λω0 + 1− ω0
)
= ω0 (1− ω0)
( Λ− 1
1 + ω0 (Λ− 1)
)
1− ω1 = 1− Λω0Λω0 + (1− ω0)
= Λω0 + (1− ω0)− Λω0Λω0 + (1− ω0)
= 1− ω0Λω0 + (1− ω0)
4.2.2 The cumulant generating function of normal mixtures
The moment generating function for a random variable is defined as
MGF (t) = E[exp(tX)]
In the case of the normal mixture being considered, the expectation can be broken into 2
components having weights 1− ω0 and ω0. This observation allows us to write the MGF as
MGF (t) = (1− ω0)E[exp(tX1)] + ω0e(G−P )t
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where X1 ∼ N (µz − P, vz)
Now, the random variable given by exp(tX1) is a log-normal, its expectation is therefore
e(µz−P )t+
t2vz
2 and so the MGF is given by
MGF (t) = (1− ω0) e(µz−P )t+
t2vz
2 + ω0e(G−P )t
Finally, since CGF (t) = log(MGF (t)) we have that
CGF (t) = log
(
(1− ω0) e(µz−P )t+
t2vz
2 + ω0e(G−P )t
)
4.2.3 The first order condition for CARA utility and the mixture of a
normal and a point mass
Investors minimize the following objective function with respect to x
min
x
log
[
(1− ω0) e−(µz−P )γx+
γ2
2 vzx
2 + ω0e−(G−P )γx
]
The firs order condition is obtained by differentiating with respect to x and setting the
result equal to zero. This yields,
(−γ (µz − P ) + γ2vzx) (1− ω0) e−(µz−P )γx+ γ22 vzx2 − (G− P ) γω0e−(G−P )γx
(1− ω0) e−(µz−P )γx+
γ2
2 vzx
2 + ω0e−(G−P )γx
= 0
The terms in the denominator are structly positive. Therefore the first order condition is
given by
(
−γ (µz − P ) + γ2vzx
)
(1− ω0) e−(µz−P )γx+
γ2
2 vzx
2 − (G− P ) γω0e−(G−P )γx = 0
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4.2.4 Equilibrium demand
x = (µz − P)γ (1 − ω0 )e
−µzγx+ γ
2
2 vzx
2 + (G− P ) γω0e−(G−P )γx
γ2vz(1 − ω0 )e−(µz−P )γx+
γ2
2 vzx
2
= (µz − P)
γvz
+ (G− P )
γvz
(
ω0
1− ω0
)
e
−
[
(G−µz)γx+ γ
2
2 vzx
2
]
= (µz − P)
γvz
+ (G− P )
γvz
(
ω0
1− ω0
)
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
x−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2− (µz−G)22vz ]
4.2.5 Equilibrium price
Setting supply, which is assumed to be 1, equal to demand, x yields
1 = (µz − P)
γvz
+ (G− P )
γvz
(
ω0
1− ω0
)
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2+ (µz−G)22vz ]
P =
µz
γvz
+ Gγvz
(
ω0
1−ω0
)
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2+ (µz−G)22vz ] − 1
1
γvz
+ 1γvz
(
ω0
1−ω0
)
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2+ (µz−G)22vz ]
P =
µz +G
(
ω0
1−ω0
)
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2+ (µz−G)22vz ] − γvz
1 +
(
ω0
1−ω0
)
e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2+ (µz−G)22vz ]
P = (µz − γvz) (1− ω0) +Gω0e
−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2+ (µz−G)22vz ]
1− ω0
(
1− e−
[
γ2
2 vz
(
1−
(
µz−G
γvz
))2+ (µz−G)22vz ])
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4.2.6 Iterative Belief updating
We consider the investor’s information-set at the start of date-t: if the signal is true then
Ψt ∼ N (G, vε)
however if it is not true then
Ψt ∼ N (Et−1 [z] , vε + Vt−1 [z])
These hypotheses yield the following prior densities respectively,
Lt (ψt|True) = 1√2pivε exp
(
−(ψt −G)
2
2vε
)
Lt (ψt|False) = 1√2pi (vε + Vt−1 [z])exp
(
− (ψt − Et−1 [z])
2
2 (vε + Vt−1 [z])
)
Define the likelihood ratio,
Λt =
Lt (ψt|True)
Lt (ψt|False)
=
1√
2pivε
exp
(
− (ψt−G)22vε
)
1√
2pi(vε+Vt−1[z])
exp
(
− (ψt−Et−1[z])22(vε+Vt−1[z])
)
=
√
2pi (vε + Vt−1 [z])
2pivε
exp
(
−
(
(ψt −G)2
2vε
− (ψt − Et−1 [z])
2
2 (vε + Vt−1 [z])
))
=
√
1 + 1
vε
Vt−1 [z]exp
(
vε (ψt − Et−1 [z])2 − (vε + Vt−1 [z]) (ψt −G)2
2 (vε + Vt−1 [z])
)
130
4.2.7 Tractible Bayesian Updaing
Consider the investor’s information-set at the start of date-t but having the date-0 prior. If
the signal is true then Ψt ∼ N (G, vεt ) which yields the following prior density for θt
L˜t (θt|True) = 1√
2pi
(vε
t
)exp
(
−(θt −G)
2
2
(vε
t
) )
If on the other hand, G is irrelevant, then Ψt ∼ N (µz, vεt + vz) which yields the following
prior density for θt
L˜t (θt|False) = 1√
2pi
(vε
t + vz
)exp
(
− (θt − µz)
2
2
(vε
t + vz
))
Now define the likelihood ratio,
Λ˜t =
L˜t (θt|True)
L˜t (θt|False)
=
1√
2pi( vεt )
exp
(
− (θt−G)22( vεt )
)
1√
2pi( vεt +vz)
exp
(
− (θt−µz)22( vεt +vz)
)
=
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
)
exp
(
(θt − µz)2
2 (vε + vzt) /t
− (θt −G)
2
2vε/t
)
=
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
)
exp
(
vε (θt − µz)2 − (vε + vzt) (θt −G)2
2vε (vε + vzt) /t
)
=
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
)
exp
−vzt
(
θt −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
+ (µz −G)2
(
(vε+vzt)vε
vzt
)
2vε (vε + vzt) /t

=
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
)
exp
−vzt
(
θt −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2vε (vε + vzt) /t
+ (µz −G)
2
2vz

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4.2.8 Condition for an expected increase in ωt, conditional on z
1
ω0 + (1− ω0)Eθt
[
1
Λ˜t
] > 1
1 > ω0 + (1− ω0)Eθt
[ 1
Λ˜t
]
1− ω0 > (1− ω0)Eθt
[ 1
Λ˜t
]
1 > Eθt
[ 1
Λ˜t
]
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4.2.9 Unconditional expectation of the likelihood ratio
Ez
[
Eψ1 [Λ1| z]
]
≡ 1
Note explicitly that the likelihood ratio as a function of ψ.
The first expectation is the integral given by
Eψ1 [Λ1| z] =
∞ˆ
−∞
Λ1 (ψ) dPψ1
The second integral is given by
Ez
[
Eψ1 [Λ1| z]
]
=
∞ˆ
−∞
Eψ1 [Λ1| z] dP z
Combining these into an explicit double integral yields
Ez
[
Eψ1 [Λ1| z]
]
=
∞ˆ
−∞
∞ˆ
−∞
Λ1 (ψ1) dPψ1dP z
=
∞ˆ
−∞
∞ˆ
−∞
Λ1 (ψ1) fψ (ψ1) fz (z) dψ1dz
Where fψ (ψ1) and fg (z)are the probability density functions of ψ and z respectively.
fg (z) = 1√2pivz exp
(
−(µz − z)
2
2vz
)
fψ (ψ1) =
1√
2pivε
exp
(
−(ψ1 − z)
2
2vε
)
The product of the terms inside the double integral yields,
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Λ1 (ψ1) fψ (ψ1) fg (z) =
exp
(
− ((ψ−µz)−κ)22vε +
(ψ−µz)2
2(vε+vz) −
(ψ1−z)2
2vε −
(µz−z)2
2vz
)
√
2pi
(
2pivz(vε)2
vz+vε
)
=
exp
(
−
(
z−
(
µzvε+ψ1vz
vε+vz
))2
2
(
vεvz
vε+vz
) +− ((ψ−µz)−κ)22vε
)
√
2pi
(
vεvz
vε+vz
)
vε
This is simply the probability density function of a bivariate normal centered at
G = µz + κ
and
E1 [z|ψ] = µzvε + ψ1vz
vε + vz
The mass under a well defined pdf is unity therefore
Ez
[
Eψ1 [Λ1| z]
]
≡ 1
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4.2.10 Expected value of exponential of the quadratic of a Normal
EDt
[
exp
(
A (x−B)2
)]
=
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
(
A (x−B)2
) 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
dx
= 1
σ
√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
(
Ax2 − 2ABx+AB2 − x
2
2σ2 +
µx
σ2
− µ
2
2σ2
)
dx
= 1
σ
√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
(
−
(
−Ax2 + 2ABx−AB2 + x
2
2σ2 −
µx
σ2
+ µ
2
2σ2
))
dx
= 1
σ
√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
(
−
((
1− 2Aσ2
2σ2
)
x2 +
(
2ABσ2 − µ
σ2
)
x
+
(
µ2 − 2AB2σ2
2σ2
)))
dx
= 1
σ
√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
(
−
(
1− 2Aσ2
2σ2
)(
x2 − 2
(
µ− 2ABσ2
1− 2Aσ2
)
x
+
(
µ2 − 2AB2σ2
1− 2Aσ2
)))
dx
= 1
σ
√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
−(1− 2Aσ22σ2
)(x− (µ− 2ABσ21− 2Aσ2
))2
−
(
µ− 2ABσ2
1− 2Aσ2
)2
+
(
µ2 − 2AB2σ2
1− 2Aσ2
) dx
= 1
σ
√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
−(1− 2Aσ22σ2
)(x− (µ− 2ABσ21− 2Aσ2
))2
+
(
1− 2Aσ2) (µ2 − 2AB2σ2)− (µ− 2ABσ2)2
(1− 2Aσ2)2
))
dx
= 1
σ
√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
−(1− 2Aσ22σ2
)(x− (µ− 2ABσ21− 2Aσ2
))2
−2A (B − µ)
2 σ2
(1− 2Aσ2)2
))
dx
=
exp
(
2A(B−µ)2σ2
2σ2(1−2Aσ2)
)
σ
√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
−
(
x−
(
µ−2ABσ2
1−2Aσ2
))2
2
(
σ√
1−2Aσ2
)2
 dx
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Now, notice that
1(
σ√
1−2Aσ2
)√
2pi
∞ˆ
−∞
exp
−
(
x−
(
µ−2ABσ2
1−2Aσ2
))2
2
(
σ√
1−2Aσ2
)2
 dx = 1
since it is the integral over the real line for the pdf of a normal distribution with mean
µ−2ABσ2
1−2Aσ2 and standard deviation
σ√
1−2Aσ2 .
Therefore we have that
EDt
[
exp
(
A (x−B)2
)]
= 1√
1− 2Aσ2 exp
(
2A (B − µ)2 σ2
2σ2 (1− 2Aσ2)
)
= 1√
1− 2Aσ2 exp
(
A (B − µ)2
1− 2Aσ2
)
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4.2.11 Conditional expectation of 1Λ˜t
Utilizing lemma 1, set
A = vzt2vε (vε + vzt) /t
B = vε (G− µz)
vzt
+G
m = z
s2 =
vε|True
t
Therefore,
(m−B)2 =
(
z −
(
vε (G− µz)
vzt
+G
))2
1− 2As2 = 1− 2 vzt2vε (vε + vzt) /t
vε|True
t
= 1− vzvε|Truet
vε (vε + vzt)
=
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
vε (vε + vzt)
A
1− 2As2 =
(
vzt
2vε (vε + vzt) /t
)
/
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
vε (vε + vzt)
)
= vzt
2
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)
/t
So that,
A (m−B)2
1− 2As2 =
vzt
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)
/t
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Therefore,
Eθt
[ 1
Λ˜t
]
=
exp
(
− (µz−G)22vz
)
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
) Eθt
exp
vzt
(
θt −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2vε (vε + vzt) /t


=
exp
(
− (µz−G)22vz
)
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
) 1√
vε(vε+vzt)−vzvε|Truet
vε(vε+vzt)
exp
 vzt
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)
/t

=
(√
vε
vε + vzt
√
vε (vε + vzt)
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
exp
(
−(µz −G)
2
2vz
)
· exp
 vzt
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)
/t


=
vε exp
(
− (µz−G)22vz
)
√
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
exp
 (vzt)2
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)

This is valid when,
A <
1
2s2
vzt
2vε (vε + vzt) /t
<
1
2vε|Truet
vε|Truevzt < vε (vε + vzt)
vε|True < vε
(
vε
vzt
+ 1
)
which is always satisfied when vε|True < vε since vεvzt ≥ 0
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4.2.12 Conditional expectation of Λ˜t
Utilizing lemma 1, set
A = −vzt2vε (vε + vzt) /t
B = vε (G− µz)
vzt
+G
m = z
s2 =
vε|True
t
Therefore,
(m−B)2 =
(
z −
(
vε (G− µz)
vzt
+G
))2
1− 2As2 = 1 + 2 vzt2vε (vε + vzt) /t
vε|True
t
= 1 +
vzvε|Truet
vε (vε + vzt)
=
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
vε (vε + vzt)
A
1− 2As2 =
(
vzt
2vε (vε + vzt) /t
)
/
(
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
vε (vε + vzt)
)
= vzt
2
(
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
)
/t
So that,
A (m−B)2
1− 2As2 =
−vzt
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2
(
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
)
/t
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Therefore,
Eθt
[
Λ˜t
]
=
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
)
exp
(
(µz −G)2
2vz
)
Eθt
exp
−vzt
(
θt −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2vε (vε + vzt) /t


=
√
1 + t
(
vz
vε
)
exp
(
(µz−G)2
2vz
)
√
vε(vε+vzt)+vzvε|Truet
vε(vε+vzt)
exp
 −vzt
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2
(
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
)
/t

=
√√√√ (vε + vzt)2
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
exp
(
(µz −G)2
2vz
)
exp
 −vzt
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2
(
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
)
/t

=
(vε + vzt) exp
(
(µz−G)2
2vz
)
√
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
exp
− (vzt)2
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet
)

This is valid when,
A <
1
2s2
vzt
2vε (vε + vzt) /t
<
1
2vε|Truet
vε|Truevzt < vε (vε + vzt)
vε|True < vε
(
vε
vzt
+ 1
)
which is always satisfied when vε|True < vε since vεvzt ≥ 0
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4.2.13 Unconditional expectation of 1Λ˜t
Utilizing lemma 1, set
A = (vzt)
2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)
B = vε (G− µz)
vzt
+G
m = µz
s2 = vz
Therefore,
(m−B)2 =
(
µz −
(
vε (G− µz)
vzt
+G
))2
=
(
1 + vε
vzt
)2
(G− µz)2
1− 2As2 = 1− 2 (vzt)
2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)vz
= 1− (vzt)
2
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
=
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
A
1− 2As2 =
 (vzt)2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)
 /(vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)
= (vzt)
2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
)
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So that,
A (m−B)2
1− 2As2 =
(vzt)2
(
1 + vεvzt
)2
(G− µz)2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
)
Therefore,
EM [Υ (z)] =
vε exp
(
− (G−µz)22vz
)
√
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
EM
exp
 (vzt)2
(
z −
(
vε(G−µz)
vzt
+G
))2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
)


=
vε exp
(
− (G−µz)22vz
)
√
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
1√
vε(vε+vzt)−vzvε|Truet−(vzt)2
vε(vε+vzt)−vzvε|Truet
exp
 (vzt)2
(
1 + vεvzt
)2
(G− µz)2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
)

= vε√
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
exp
 (vzt)2
(
1 + vεvzt
)2
(G− µz)2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
)
−(µz −G)
2
2vz
)
= vε√
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
exp
(
(µz −G)2
2vz(vzt)2
(
1 + vεvzt
)2 − (vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2)
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
 )
= vε√
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
exp
(
(µz −G)2
2vz(
(vε + vzt)2 − vε (vε + vzt) + vzvε|Truet+ (vzt)2
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
) )
= vε√
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
exp
(µz −G)2
(
(vε + vzt) +
(
vε|True + vzt
))
2
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet− (vzt)2
)
/t

This is valid when,
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A <
1
2s2
(vzt)2
2vz
(
vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
) < 12vz
(vzt)2 < vε (vε + vzt)− vzvε|Truet
vzvε|Truet < (vε)2 + vεvzt− (vzt)2
vε|True <
(vε)2 + vεvzt− (vzt)2
vzt
The above condition is satisfiable when (vε)
2+vεvzt−(vzt)2
vzt
> 0, which requires 0 < (vε)2 +
vεvzt− (vzt)2. This is only possible if,
vε >
−vzt+
√
(vzt)2 + 4 (vzt)2
2
= vzt
(√
5− 1
2
)
This condition is the same as 1+
√
5
2 >
vzt
vε
4.2.14 Derivation of Returns
Recall that,
Pt =
λtωtG+ (1− ωt)pit
1− ωt (1− λt)
Returns are therefore given by,
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Rt = Pt − Pt−1
= λtωtG+ (1− ωt)pit1− ωt (1− λt) −
λt−1ωt−1G+ (1− ωt−1)pit−1
1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)
= (1− ωt) ∆pit1− ωt (1− λt) +
λtωtG+ (1− ωt)pit−1
1− ωt (1− λt) −
λt−1ωt−1G+ (1− ωt−1)pit−1
1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)
= 1− ωt1− ωt (1− λt)
(
∆pit +
λtωtG+ (1− ωt)pit−1
1− ωt
−(λt−1ωt−1G+ (1− ωt−1)pit−1) (1− ωt (1− λt))(1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)) (1− ωt)
)
= 1− ωt1− ωt (1− λt)
(
∆pit +
λtωt (G− pit−1)
1− ωt −
λt−1ωt−1 (G− pit−1) (1− ωt (1− λt))
(1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)) (1− ωt)
)
= 1− ωt1− ωt (1− λt)
(
∆pit +
(G− pit−1) (λtωt (1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1))− λt−1ωt−1 (1− ωt (1− λt)))
(1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)) (1− ωt)
)
= 1− ωt1− ωt (1− λt)
(
∆pit +
(G− pit−1) (λtωt (1− ωt−1)− λt−1ωt−1 (1− ωt))
(1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)) (1− ωt)
)
= 1− ωt1− ωt (1− λt)
(
∆pit +
(G− pit−1) (λt (ωt − ωt−1) + ∆λtωt−1 (1− ωt))
(1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)) (1− ωt)
)
= 1− ωt1− ωt (1− λt)
∆pit + (G− pit−1)
(
λt
(
ωt−ωt−1
1−ωt
)
+ ∆λtωt−1
)
1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)

And since,
ωt =
Λt−1ωt−1
Λt−1ωt−1 + (1− ωt−1) ⇐⇒
ωt − ωt−1
(1− ωt) = ωt−1 (Λt−1 − 1)
we have that
Rt =
1− ωt
1− ωt (1− λt)
(
∆pit +
(G− pit−1) (λt (Λt−1 − 1) + ∆λt)ωt−1
1− ωt−1 (1− λt−1)
)
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